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(영문) 수원지방법원 2017.11.16 2017나2882
근저당권말소
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

Reasons

1. The defendant's ground for appeal citing the judgment of the court of first instance is not significantly different from the argument in the court of first instance, and even if the evidence submitted in the court of first instance shows each evidence submitted in this court, the fact-finding and judgment of the court of first instance are justified.

Therefore, the reasoning of the judgment of this court is as follows, except where the defendant added a judgment on the contents claimed by this court, and therefore, it is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance.

2. Additional determination

A. The Defendant’s assertion D renounced the benefits of the completion of extinctive prescription by setting up a written confirmation (Evidence No. 1) that he/she promised to repay with the recognition of the secured obligation of the instant mortgage and delivering it to the Defendant.

B. Determination 1) The recognition of an obligation as a ground for interruption of the extinctive prescription does not require any effect upon notification of the so-called concept established by an obligor, who is a party to the interruption of the extinctive prescription, to the effect that the obligor would lose his/her claim against the obligor who is the party to the interruption of the extinctive prescription, with knowledge of the other party’s right or obligation. On the other hand, to recognize waiver of the extinctive prescription benefits after the expiration of the prescription period, the obligor who receives the benefit of prescription needs not be legally entitled to any legal benefit due to the completion of the prescription. Therefore, even if the obligor has obtained the recognition of the obligation that constitutes the ground for interruption of the extinctive prescription after the expiration of the prescription period, it cannot be readily concluded that D immediately made an expression of intent to waive the benefit of extinctive prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, Feb. 28, 2013).

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