1. The Plaintiff has the power to execute the protocol of compromise No. 2012 Ghana, 25207 against the Gwangju District Court's Netcheon Branch.

1. Basic facts

A. On January 20, 198, the Plaintiff is a corporation established for the purpose of establishing and operating medical welfare facilities for the aged under the Social Welfare Services Act, and the Plaintiff establishes and operates B medical care centers for the aged under the Social Welfare Services Act and the Welfare of the Aged Act.

B. On December 28, 2012, the Defendant filed a lawsuit against the B Care Center for the payment of KRW 64,086,000 for the goods under the Gwangju District Court’s 2012Gadan25207, and agreed with C, the date for preparatory pleading of the instant case, which was the date for preparatory pleading of the first instance, as follows.

In addition, the above court made a protocol of protocol of claim recording on the same day (hereinafter “instant protocol of claim”).

Section 1.3

1. The Defendant shall pay 64,086,000 won to the Plaintiff by June 30, 2013. If the above-mentioned deadline expires, the damages for delay calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment shall be paid with respect to the unpaid amount.

2. By March 8, 2013, the Plaintiff completes the installation of central control and multi-functional control devices and the rest of toilet tent construction to the Defendant.

3. The plaintiff waives the remaining claims.

4. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by each person;

C. On October 30, 2013, the Defendant seized each of the corporeal movables listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter referred to as “corporeal movables No. 1, etc.”) according to the instant protocol of protocol of protocol (hereinafter “instant compulsory execution”) (hereinafter “instant compulsory execution”).

【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there has been no dispute, entry of Gap Nos. 1, 2, and 3, the purport of the whole pleading

2. Since the Plaintiff’s judgment on the compulsory execution of corporeal movables Nos. 1 through 35 did not conflict between the parties, the fact that the owner of corporeal movables was the owner of corporeal movables Nos. 1 through 35, the part of the compulsory execution of this case against corporeal movables Nos. 1 through 35 should be denied as against the goods owned by the Plaintiff, a third party, other than B medical care source, indicated in