1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation of this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the following parts, and thus, this is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

[Supplementary Contents] The 3rd to 8th to 13th of the first instance judgment

2.(2) Of the allegations of the parties, parts (2) shall be filled by the following:

Around November 21, 2014, G representing the Plaintiff agreed to refund the lease deposit after deducting the unpaid rent and damages incurred up to that time from the Defendant’s obligation on the condition that H and D order the Defendant to surrender the instant officetel to the Defendant. However, D did not order the instant officetel to the Defendant, and the Plaintiff did not withdraw D from the said officetel. Therefore, the Defendant’s obligation to return the lease deposit to the Plaintiff was not established as an unrefluent condition or did not perform the prior performance obligation. Therefore, the Defendant did not have any obligation to return the lease deposit to the Plaintiff, and the Defendant did not have any obligation to return the lease deposit to the Plaintiff (the non-performance of the suspension condition or the non-performance of the first obligation to perform the first obligation to perform the first obligation). In the first instance judgment, the part of the judgment on the Defendant’s assertion, as set forth in subparagraphs 11 through 19, as follows.

"I examine the non-performance of the condition of suspension or non-performance of the prior performance obligation."

In full view of the statements in the evidence Nos. 1 and 4 and witness G of the first instance trial, the fact that G representing the Plaintiff agreed to receive a refund of the lease deposit when he/she ordered the Defendant to order the instant officetel to the Defendant before the expiration of the term of validity of the instant lease agreement, which was the representative of the Defendant before the expiration of the term of validity of the instant lease agreement.

However, in light of the following circumstances and facts that can be recognized by comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments as seen earlier, the instant agreement expired.