The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than eight months.

Provided, That the above punishment shall be imposed for two years from the date this judgment became final and conclusive.

1. The main point of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (two years of suspended execution in August, 40 hours of lecture for sexual assault treatment, and two years of employment restrictions, such as children and juveniles-related institutions, etc.) is too uneased and unreasonable;

2. Ex officio determination

A. The main sentence of Article 59-3(1) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities (amended by Act No. 15904, Dec. 11, 2018; effective June 12, 2019; hereinafter “amended Act”) provides that where the court imposes a sex offense (referring to a sexual crime defined in Article 2(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes or a sex offense against children and juveniles defined in subparagraph 2 of Article 2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse) and imposes an order to operate welfare facilities for a certain period or not to provide employment or actual labor at welfare facilities for disabled persons simultaneously with the judgment of a sex offense case. The proviso to the said provision provides that the same shall not apply to cases where the risk of recidivism is remarkably low or where the employment of disabled persons is restricted or where there are other special circumstances that do not restrict.

In addition, the above provision shall also apply to a person who has committed a sex offense and has not received a final judgment prior to the enforcement of the amended Act (Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended Act).

The instant facts charged constitute a sex offense committed before the enforcement of the foregoing Act, and thus, the lower court should have determined whether to issue an employment restriction order with respect to welfare facilities for the disabled in accordance with Article 59-3(1) of the amended Act and Article 2 of the Addenda thereof, so long as the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant facts charged on June 12, 2019 and sentenced to punishment.

However, while the court below issued a two-year employment restriction order to a child or juvenile-related institution, it did not make any decision on whether the employment of welfare facilities for the disabled was restricted. Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles.

However, it is against welfare facilities for the disabled.