1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

The defendant of the claim shall be attached to the plaintiff.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of this court citing the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows. Except for the addition of the arguments and judgments in the court of first instance to the following, the grounds of the judgment of this court citing the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act shall be as follows.

2. Next, the defendant asserts that the second lease contract of this case was concluded after the term of office as the Chairperson, and even if F did not have the authority to conclude the second lease contract of this case, F had the power to represent the conclusion of the second lease contract of this case. The defendant was believed at the time F still to have concluded the second lease contract of this case within the scope of its power of representation, and there was no negligence on the part. Thus, the plaintiff is liable for the expression representative under Articles 129 and 126, which are applied mutatis mutandis by Article 59(2) of the Civil Act.

In light of the fact that the date of preparation of the second lease agreement in March 20, 2013, which was prepared by the F and the Defendant on March 20, 2013, it is difficult to deem that there was no negligence on the part of the Defendant that it was believed that the F and the Defendant had continued to have been in existence of the F’s power of representation.

In addition, as long as F entered into the first lease agreement of this case according to the resolution of the clan general meeting, the power of representation to enter into the lease agreement of this case was already extinguished. Thus, it cannot be deemed that F had the power of representation to enter into the lease agreement of this case as the basic authority for applying Article 126 of the Civil Act to F at the time of entering into the second lease agreement of this case

Therefore, the above assertion of representative responsibility is without merit.

Finally, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff ratified F's act of unauthorized representation, and therefore, the second lease contract of this case is the first lease contract of this case.