The case holding that rules of employment in violation of the collective agreement shall be null and void and that dismissal under these rules shall be void.

The provision that “the owner of a traffic accident who is at least 200,000 won of property damage” in the Rules of Employment of the Defendant Company may be dismissed is null and void as it violates the collective agreement applicable to the Defendant Company, and otherwise is not attributable to the employee (Articles 27 and 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act), the dismissal of the employee under the said rules is null and void.

Articles 27 and 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act, Article 36 of the Trade Union Act

Lofficacy

Mama Transportation Corporation

1. The defendant confirmed that his dismissal against the plaintiff on September 11, 1982 is null and void.

2. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 5,617,039 won and the amount of 3,320,906 won with 25% interest per annum from September 1, 1983 to the date of full payment.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Determination as to the claim for nullification of dismissal

The defendant's disciplinary action against the plaintiff on September 11, 1982 is without dispute between the parties, and evidence Nos. 1, 3 (Notice of Discipline), 4 through 8 (Investigation Report, Inspection Report, Traffic Accident Report), 12, 13 (Rules of Employment), 1-2 (Rules of Employment), 14 (Medical Examination Report), 14 (Agreement) of the same No. 14, 14 (Agreement) of the above No. 5) of the above No. 14 of the above No. 5 of the Rules of Employment, and the defendant's testimony at the time of dismissal of the plaintiff 1 to 3 of the above No. 8 of the above No. 1 of the above No. 44 of the above No. 1 of the above No. 5 of the Rules of Employment, and the defendant's testimony at the time of dismissal of the plaintiff 2 of the above No. 1 of the above No. 5 of the above No. 1 of the above No. 4 of the above No. 97 of the present No. 1 of the disaster No. 1 of the plaintiff 1 of the present 4 of Seoul. 197.

The plaintiff's attorney argues that the above dismissal against the plaintiff is invalid on the premise that Article 13 (4) of the Rules of Employment of the defendant company goes against the collective agreement or the Labor Standards Act entered into between the National Automobile Union Federation of Korea and the representative of the defendant passenger transportation service, and thus, the above dismissal against the plaintiff is valid. The defendant's attorney argues that the above dismissal is legitimate, and therefore the defendant's attorney is not subject to any disadvantage such as dismissal against the worker without any justifiable reason (Article 27 (1) of the Act), and the Labor Standards Act may be dismissed if the worker is attributable to the worker (Article 27-2 of the Act), but the above ground shall be approved by the Labor Relations Commission (Article 10 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act), and the representative of the labor union and the employer's association shall establish the rules of employment or labor contract which violates the criteria for the treatment of workers such as working conditions by concluding a collective agreement and other matters shall be invalidated (Article 33 and Article 36 (1) of the Trade Union Act) of the Labor Standards Act).

However, if Gap's evidence and evidence Nos. 2 (collective agreement, Eul evidence No. 2) without any dispute over its formation gather the whole purport of oral argument, the defendant entered into a collective agreement with the Korean Automobile Workers' Union of Seoul and the Seoul Metropolitan Government Office on September 22, 1981 with the validity period of two years. Thus, according to Article 13 of the above Convention which applies to the defendant's workplace, "the employee shall not exercise his right to indemnity against the employee, and shall not take personnel measures only for the employee who was summary indicted due to an accident, unless he or she had any other accident, since he or she joined the bus driver of the defendant company on June 26, 1978, and worked without any accident, he or she compensates for damages and agreed on the fact that he or she was subject to a non-prosecution disposition by the competent prosecutor's office on September 22, 1981, and the above part of the witness's testimony cannot be viewed as violating the above Article 13 of the Labor Standards Act without any justifiable reason for dismissal.

The defendant's attorney, in certain cases, concluded prior to the enactment of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, which provides that no prosecution shall be instituted upon the occurrence of an agreement between the traffic accident parties on compensation for damages (as of December 31, 1981), and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the above dismissal provision becomes null and void under the Rules of Employment. In addition, the plaintiff would have been subject to full indictment and punishment if he did not have the above Act. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the above collective agreement was modified after the enactment of the above Act, and that the above agreement still remains null and void in light of the evidence of the above recognition. Thus, the above assertion is clearly groundless (On the other hand, the defendant prepared a presumption of vehicle damage under the name of the defendant in collusion with the maintenance business operator, etc. to avoid dismissal after the accident and avoid criminal punishment, so the above dismissal is justified. However, since the above grounds are not included in the grounds for disciplinary action of this case, the defendant's aforementioned assertion cannot be accepted)

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim seeking confirmation that the dismissal on September 11, 1982 against the defendant who asserted the above dismissal is null and void, because the plaintiff's ground for the above traffic accident does not constitute a justifiable ground for dismissal of the plaintiff.

2. Determination on the claim for wages

On September 11, 1982, dismissal of the plaintiff was 10.0 billion won as above, the plaintiff still has the status as the driver of the defendant company, and as long as the dismissal was attributable to the defendant who is the employer, the plaintiff has the right to receive ordinary wages equivalent to the plaintiff's driver, unless there are special circumstances. The above ordinary wages include not only the time when the plaintiff is dismissed but also the increased amount of wages according to the provisions of the collective agreement of the defendant company after that time, increase in salary or salary class, etc. The above amount includes health class 4-3 (decision), regardless of evidence and formation 8-1, 2, 3 (Delivery, Determination, Notice). 1, 9-2, 10-1, 9-2, 9-1, 10, 12 (Ruling, 10-2, 11-2, 3, 40-2, 9-2, 9-2, 9-3, 9-2, and 9-3, 5-2, 3,0-1, respectively.

위 인정사실에 의하면, 피고는 원고에게 위 해고된 날 이후로써 원고가 구하는 1982. 11. 1.부터 다음해 6월말까지 8개월동안 급료와 연말상여금으로써 합계 금 3,320,906원〔781,534(=390,767×2)+194,770+2,344,602(=390,767×6)〕과 1983. 7. 1.부터 정년퇴직일 이전의 기간중 원고가 구하는 이 사건 변론종결일임이 기록상 명백한 1983. 12. 20.까지의 5개월 20일간의 급료로서 금 2,296,133원(404,200×5+405,200 20＼30 : 원 미만은 버림) 등 합계 금 5,617,039원을 지급할 의무가 있다고 할 것이다.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, it is confirmed that the dismissal of the defendant against the plaintiff on September 11, 1982 is null and void, and the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff the amount of 5,617,039 won as a salary and the amount of 3,320,906 won as requested by the plaintiff, as well as the amount of 5,617,039 won as a fee, at the rate of 25% per annum under Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from September 1, 1983 to the full payment day. Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case is accepted in all reasonable reasons, and the expenses of this case shall be borne by the plaintiff, Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 6 of the above Special Cases Concerning the Pronouncement, and Article 6 of the above Special Cases Concern

Judges Kim Shin (Presiding Judge)