1. Each of the plaintiffs' appeals is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, invoked by the court of first instance, is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following portions as stated in the supplementary judgment, and thus, is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence

2. Supplementary judgment

A. The Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that, up to the trial of the party, the deceased G was in the status of its office capacity at the time of formulating the instant agreement.

B. “Capacity” means mental ability or intelligence that can be reasonably determined on the basis of normal perception and history, and whether a person has a capacity to act must be determined individually in connection with a specific juristic act. Whether a person has a capacity to act at the time of the juristic act should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the nature of the contract, motive and circumstance of the contract, reasonableness of the terms of the contract, attitude of the contract after the contract, etc., which is concluded with objective data, such as a mental sentiment or diagnosis document that can be inferred at the time of the act.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2001Da10113 delivered on October 11, 2002, etc.). C.

Examining the fact, according to the inquiry reply to the head of the Ansan University Hospital at the time of December 20, 2017, there is a medical opinion that “the deceased was observed on July 9, 2012 in the state of dementia during which he/she lost his/her speech ability, and this is deemed difficult to recover his/her normal recognition and expression ability until the time of death.”

However, the circumstances that can be recognized by comprehensively considering the statement No. 8, the testimony of the witness of the trial, the fact-finding inquiry letter to the Pdong community service center, and the overall purport of the arguments, namely, the Dong G received class 3 of the long-term care class from the National Health Insurance Corporation at the time of the enactment of the instant agreement. Article 7(1)3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Long-Term Care Insurance Act on the part of the beneficiaries of the above long-term care class 3 cannot be seen as