The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the second ground for appeal

Article 71 (1) of the former Customs Act (amended by Act No. 8852 of Feb. 29, 2008; hereinafter the same) provides that "in case where it is necessary to facilitate the import of specific goods in order to supply and demand active goods or enhance the competitiveness of the industry, customs duties may be imposed at a rate within the limit of 40/100 at the basic tariff rate, and if it is deemed necessary, the quantity may be limited," and Article 92 (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20720 of Feb. 29, 2008; hereinafter the same) delegated by the Commissioner of the Korea Customs Service provides that "the allocation of a certain quantity in accordance with Article 71 of the former Customs Act shall be made within the limit of the relevant quantity or the recommendation of the delegated person" and Paragraph (4) of the same Article provides that "the head of the relevant customs office, upon receipt of a letter of recommendation from the delegated person, shall submit it to the head of the relevant customs office".

The lower court determined as follows: ① under Article 71 of the former Customs Act and Article 92 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, the Korea Petroleum Association recommended the quota tariff for the relevant month to the petroleum refining business operator with the production and supply of raw milk for the manufacture of naphtha; ② on December 2, 2005, the Plaintiff applied for the quota tariff recommendation within 650,361.79 times as much as the number within which the quota tariff can be recommended for the relevant month; ② on December 5, 2005, the Korea Petroleum Association had already received the recommendation for the quota tariff from the head of Korea Petroleum Association to the Defendant on December 1, 2005, the Korea Petroleum Association did not submit the said quota tariff to the Defendant by the method of electronic data transmission and storage of 60 times as requested by the Plaintiff (the ER number 3-252-01, 003-334, 650, 361.79 times, 205).

In light of the above provisions and relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the submission requirements of the quota tariff recommendation statement

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3

Article 83(1) of the former Customs Act provides that "any person who intends to use goods whose tariff rates are differently determined by Presidential Decree or Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy according to their original purposes shall obtain approval from the head of a customs office as prescribed by Presidential Decree. However, this provision shall not apply in cases where the nature and form of such goods cannot be used for any purpose other than their original purposes." Article 97 of the former Enforcement Decree of the former Customs Act provides that "any person who intends to be subject to the usage tariff rate under Article 83 of the Act shall submit to the head of a customs office an application stating the name, size, quantity, price, use, method of use and place of use from the time on which the import declaration of the relevant goods is made to the time on which the relevant import declaration is accepted." Meanwhile, Article 277(1)2 of the former Customs Act provides that "any person who violates the provisions of Article 83(1) shall be punished by a fine

The legislative intent of Article 83(1) of the former Customs Act is to ensure that the head of a customs office confirms the nature, quantity, purpose, etc. of the goods whose tariff rate varies in accordance with the purpose of use under Article 71 of the former Customs Act before an import declaration is accepted, and thereby efficiently manages whether the goods are ordinarily used for the reported purpose. The former Customs Act does not stipulate Article 71 in the case of violation of Article 83(1), but only provides a minor disciplinary provision that imposes an administrative fine under Article 277(1)2, and thereby, can achieve the legislative purpose of Article 83(1) of the former Customs Act, and it is difficult to deem that the violation of Article 83(1) of the former Customs Act is considerably detrimental to the public interest to the extent that it does not exclude the application of Article 71 of the former Customs Act. Thus, it is reasonable to impose an obligation to cooperate with the person who intends to obtain the usage tariff rate from the head of the customs office in accordance with Article 83(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the former Customs Act.

Based on its employment evidence, the court below acknowledged the Plaintiff’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s request for correction of customs duties and value-added taxes on the ground that the Plaintiff did not apply 0% of the quota tariff but applied 1% of the quota tariff for raw milk other than the manufacture of naphtha, upon receiving the recommendation of the quota tariff from the Korea Petroleum Association for the manufacture of naphtha, and the Plaintiff filed a request for correction of the customs duties and value-added taxes on August 22, 2006 on the ground that the rate of 0%, which is the quota of raw milk for the manufacture of naphtha should be applied to the instant raw milk. However, on September 4, 2006, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s request for correction of the customs duties and the rate of value-added taxes on the ground that the Plaintiff did not submit an application for correction of the quota of raw milk before the import declaration of this case was accepted. In light of the legislative purport of Article 83(1) of the former Customs Act, the court below determined that the Plaintiff did not obtain the Plaintiff’s request for correction of the quota.

In light of the above provisions, legal principles, and records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for the application of the usage tariff rate.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.