1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. As to the real estate stated in the attached list to the Plaintiff.

1. Basic facts

A. F on June 30, 194, on the real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant real estate”), F completed the registration procedure for transfer of ownership on the ground of sale on February 4, 194, as the receipt of the Circuit District Court No. 4939, Jun. 30, 194.

F’s address is written as “Seoul-gun C”.

B. Meanwhile, the land cadastre of the instant real estate at the time (hereinafter “former land cadastre”) is indicated as B by the owner of the instant real estate.

C. The Defendant was prepared and delivered a letter of guarantee from the surety G, H, and I to the effect that “the Defendant purchases the instant real estate from B, the owner registered on the land cadastre on December 1, 1985, and actually owns it at present” (hereinafter “instant letter of guarantee”).

The Defendant, based on the instant letter of guarantee, applied for issuance of a written confirmation to the head of the Si/ Gun in order to “as from December 1, 1985, the Defendant confirmed that the Defendant actually purchased the instant real estate as a memorial soil and possessed it as of the present time,” and received a written confirmation from the head of the Si/Gun in order to issue it.

E. The Defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Defendant on the ground that the Defendant purchased the instant real estate from the owner B on December 15, 1985, as the receipt of No. 3310 on December 13, 1994, pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership Transfer (amended by Act No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992; hereinafter “former Special Measures”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2 and 4 (including, if any, a serial number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of claim

A. B is a clerical error in the F, whether the F is a Japan, and whether the F is a Japan, the above facts of recognition, the evidence mentioned above, the statements in Gap's 5 through 9, and the testimony and arguments of the witness G of the first instance trial (hereinafter "G").