The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the violation of the National Security Act (e.g., praiseing, etc.) by the same Article, the so-called “crimes” as referred to in Article 7(1) of the National Security Act refers to the act of asserting that the act is identical to, or complying with, a propaganda instigate by, anti-state organizations, etc. and the activities of anti-state organizations, etc., and thus responding to, the activities of anti-state organizations, etc.

In addition, the interpretation principle that the National Security Act should be applied to cases where there is an obvious risk of substantial harm to the security of the nation's existence or the fundamental order of free democracy as well as anti-state organizations.

Therefore, an act of assistance prohibited under Article 7(1) of the National Security Act should reach the level of actively expressing his/her intent to cope with the activities of anti-state organizations, etc. to the extent that it is evaluated as “provening and encouraging the activities of anti-state organizations, etc.” under Article 7(1) of the same Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008, etc.). For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court cannot be readily concluded that the content alleged by the Defendant is provoking of North Korea’s assertion, and the assertion itself does not constitute a threat to the national security or democratic fundamental order, and there is a clear danger that the Defendant’s behavior may pose a substantial threat to the national security or democratic fundamental order.

It is difficult to conclude it.

In light of the above, the charged facts were acquitted.

The judgment below

Examining the reasoning in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination is justifiable.

In contrast to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below erred by exceeding the bounds of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on transfer of evidence under the National Security Act.