1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. The parties' assertion

A. On August 23, 2002, the Defendant was obligated to repay the debt of KRW 36 million to the Plaintiff on August 23, 2002, as the maturity date was set on August 21, 2005, by a notary public on August 21, 2005, the deed of debt repayment contract No. 3053, which was written by a notary public on August 3002.

B. Since the Defendant borrowed money from the Plaintiff as its operating fund or rehabilitation fund due to the lack of circumstances under the circumstances of D and E, the Defendant operated, this is a commercial bond, and the extinctive prescription has expired five years since the due date.

2. According to the reasoning of the evidence Nos. 1 and 2 and the purport of the entire pleadings as to whether the extinctive prescription has expired, the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that on August 22, 2002, the Plaintiff lent KRW 36 million to the Defendant’s management funds or rehabilitation funds of D and E, which the Defendant operated. As such, the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is a commercial claim.

Therefore, the period of extinctive prescription is five years pursuant to Article 64 of the Commercial Act. Since it is apparent that five years have elapsed since February 27, 2015, which was brought in the lawsuit in this case, the period of extinctive prescription expired, the plaintiff's claim was completed.

On the other hand, the plaintiff asserts to the effect that even if a loan claim is a commercial bond, since the defendant agreed to return to the plaintiff by preparing a notarial deed, its nature was changed to the agreed amount.

Even if it can be evaluated as a separate legal act from a procedural act to grant executory power, such a legal act constitutes a defendant’s commercial activity, and the period of extinctive prescription expires for five years, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is difficult to accept.

(See Supreme Court Decision 92Da169 Decided April 14, 1992, that the preparation of a notarial deed or the authentication of a promissory note is not a claim established by the same effect as that of the judgment). Next, the Plaintiff’s seizure of claims on August 21, 2014.