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(영문) 대법원 1966. 12. 22.자 66모78 결정
[항소기각][집14(3)형,073]
Main Issues

Waiver of a minor's right to appeal and consent of legal representative

Summary of Decision

As a matter of principle, the reversal of the right to appeal filed by the defendant who has a legal representative without the consent of his legal representative, and the legal representative of the defendant may file an appeal on behalf of the defendant, but it is clear pursuant to the provisions of Article 341 of this Act that the spouse, lineal relatives, siblings, and Australia may file an appeal for the defendant only if it does not go against the express will of the defendant. The court below's reversal of the right to appeal by the re-appellant is null and void without the consent of the legal representative. The court below dismissed the appeal filed by the re-appellant's parent's re-appellant's "it violates the intention of not filing

[Reference Provisions]

Article 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 350 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Re-appellant

Re-appellant

United States of America

Gwangju District Court Decision 64Ro14 delivered on October 13, 1966

Text

I reverse the original decision.

This case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Gwangju District Court.

Reasons

Article 341 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "The legal representative of the defendant may file an appeal for the defendant only if the defendant's spouse, lineal relatives, brothers and sisters are not against the defendant's explicit intention." The second-appellant's legal representative's consent to the second-appellant's appeal is clear as to the reason for the second-appellant's appeal is not effective (in the case of the proviso of Article 350 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it is an exception). However, it is clear that the defendant's legal representative has no legal representative's consent to the second-appellant's appeal without the consent of the second-appellant's legal representative's consent to the second-appellant's legal representative's consent, and it is reasonable to interpret that the second-appellant's legal representative's consent to the second-appellant's appeal has no legal representative's own effect as a waiver of the second-appellant's right to appeal without the consent of the defendant's legal representative's own decision to the second-appellant's own decision to waive the second-appellant's legal representative's right to appeal.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges.

The judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) of the Red Round (Presiding Judge)

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