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(영문) 대법원 2019.06.13 2019다204586
물품대금 등 청구의 소
Text

Of the part against the defendant in the judgment below, the part on KRW 80,784,00 and damages for delay shall be reversed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the assertion that it is unreasonable for the court below to recognize the tort liability against the defendant separately from the non-performance liability against the co-defendant B, etc. of the court below (hereinafter "the cooperative of this case"), the responsibility of the co-defendant D of the court below and the defendant's tort liability against the plaintiff are different from each other.

Therefore, as long as the requirements for establishing tort against the plaintiff are met, the defendant is liable for damages to the plaintiff. Therefore, this part of the ground of appeal that differs from this opinion is without merit.

2. As to the Defendant’s tort liability related to the supply of medicine, the lower court, based on its stated reasoning, determined that the Defendant, a de facto operator and standing director of the instant union, was liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages equivalent to KRW 37,576,423 of the amount of unpaid medicine incurred by the Plaintiff, without notifying the Plaintiff of such circumstance despite the Defendant’s duty under the good faith principle that the Defendant, who was a de facto operator and standing director of the instant union, should have known the Plaintiff that he was a so-called office hospital in violation of the Medical Service Act.

Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on deception related to the supply of drugs, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to the Defendant’s tort liability regarding the acquisition of indemnity liability

A. Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court did not notify the Plaintiff that the Defendant, who was a de facto operator and standing director of the instant union, was a so-called office hospital in violation of the Medical Service Act, and succeeded to L’s indemnity liability against the Plaintiff, the operator of the instant association.

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