All judgment of the court below shall be reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of one year and four months.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant 1) The first instance court’s punishment (one year of imprisonment) with respect to the first instance court’s sentencing is too unreasonable.

2) The automobiles stated in the judgment of the second instance court in the second instance judgment are not owned by the defendant. Thus, the crime does not constitute a crime of obstructing the exercise of rights on the premise of “self-owned property.”

B. The lower court’s sentence No. 1 of the Prosecutor (unfair in sentencing as to the first instance judgment) is too unhutiled and unreasonable.

2. As to the judgment of the court below, the prosecutor filed each appeal against the judgment of the court below against the judgment of the court below, and the court decided to hold the above appeal jointly and severally.

Each crime of the judgment below against the defendant is one of the concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and a sentence shall be imposed within the scope of the term of punishment aggravated for concurrent crimes pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act. In this regard, the judgment of the court below cannot be maintained as it is.

However, the defendant's assertion of misunderstanding of the legal principles is still subject to the judgment of this court, despite the above reasons for reversal of the legal principles.

3. Judgment on the misapprehension of the legal principle of the defendant

A. On January 21, 2014, the Defendant: (a) purchased one motor vehicle vehicle in the name of the Defendant’s wife AT 300C car in the name of the Defendant’s wife at the office of the victim filial Capital Co., Ltd., Ltd., located in 306 as the bankruptcy of Gangnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government; (b) took out a loan of eight million won from the injured party for the purpose of the vehicle loan; and (c) entered into an incidental dispatch contract to pay it for 3

1. 27. A mortgage was created on the said car with a claim for the above loan as a preserved bond, whereby the victim is a mortgagee.

After September 22, 2014, the Defendant, at around September 2, 2014, gathered with the above AA to obtain a loan as collateral and to use the said car as living expenses, such as debt repayment, while paying the vehicle installments to the victim. Since then around September 2, 2016, the Defendant took the loan as collateral, and shocked around that time.