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(영문) 전주지방법원 2020.01.15 2019노1458
도로교통법위반(음주운전)등
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Of the facts charged in this case of mistake of facts, the Defendant: (a) had the wheels of the victim L at the time, and had the victim L expressed an desire to do so once; but (b) there was no fact that the Defendant inflicted an injury upon the victim L by exercising direct violence as stated in the facts charged beyond this, and therefore, (c) there was an error of misconception of facts that the lower court convicted him of this part of the facts charged.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (two years of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below regarding the assertion of mistake of facts, in particular, according to the witness L's legal statement of the court below which is the victim of this part of the facts charged, and the witness N's statement in the investigative agency, etc., the defendant is acknowledged as not having any reasonable doubt about the fact that the defendant inflicted bodily injury upon L as stated in this part of the facts charged, by exercising violence (the defendant also led to the confession of this part of the facts charged on the third trial of the court below). Thus, there is no

This part of the defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. Judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the matters that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and that the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court solely on the ground that it differs from the appellate court’s view, and to refrain from sentencing

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