1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. From October 22, 2012, the Plaintiff worked as a bread technician at the c department located in the Busan Youngdo-gu, Busan. From March 26, 2013, around 06:00, the Plaintiff entered clothes for the preparation of bread in the c department located in the c department located in the Youngdo-gu, Busan, and then sent back to a D hospital after being putting the clothes in the c department for the preparation of bread. As a result, the Plaintiff was diagnosed as a brain-resistant cerebrovascular (hereinafter “the instant injury”).

B. On April 29, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for medical care benefits with the Defendant, but the Defendant notified the Defendant of the decision not to approve the application for medical care benefits (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that proximate causal relation between the Plaintiff’s work and the instant injury and disease was not recognized.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 2 and 9, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the legitimacy of the instant disposition

A. The plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff's action of this case is unlawful since the disease of this case occurred by performing various work, such as anti-satis, sudity, bend, and packaging, while serving at the cate point from 06:00 to 19:00 per day as a bread technician, to Saturdays from 06:0 to 16:00 on Saturdays, and Sundays from 06:0 to 09:00, while performing various work, such as anti-satis, satis, bend, and packaging, as well as by performing a duty heavier than ordinary, since the disease of this case was found to have a proximate causal relation with the job of this case.

(b) Entry in the attached Form of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes;

C. 1) The Plaintiff had been working in the bread house for about 20 years prior to entering the tasks of the Plaintiff’s contents and work status, etc., and the Plaintiff had been working from 06:00 to 19:00 on the Saturday, and worked from 06:00 on the Saturday to 16:00 on the Saturday, and on Sundays, from 06:00 to 09:00 on the three occasions on the following day.

B. The plaintiff