1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

1. In full view of the reasoning of the judgment as to the cause of the claim Gap's evidence Nos. 1 through 3 (including branch numbers), and the result of the response to the submission of taxation data to the director of the North Jeju District Tax Office of this Court, the whole purport of the pleadings, as a result of the entire pleadings, the plaintiff is obligated to provide liquor suppliers with goods such as alcoholic beverages, etc. to the previous city C cafeteria located in Seocho-gu, Seoul (hereinafter "the instant cafeteria") which was operated under the name of the defendant, and to pay 9,145,00 for the goods that were not received from the defendant during the above period, barring any special circumstance. Thus, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff the unpaid goods amounting to KRW 9,145,00 and delay damages therefrom.

2. Judgment on the defendant's assertion

A. The main point of the argument is D, which is the husband of the instant restaurant, prior to the divorce, the Defendant only lent only the name of the business operator, and the Plaintiff was well aware of such circumstances.

Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the price of the goods in this case.

B. In principle, the nominal lender who has lent his/her name to another person shall be liable for any transaction between another person and another person. However, the liability of the nominal lender under Article 24 of the Commercial Act is to protect a third party who trades by misunderstanding the nominal lender as the business owner. Therefore, if the other party to the transaction knew of or was grossly negligent in making the nominal lender known of the fact of the nominal lender, he/she shall not be held liable. In this case, whether the other party to the transaction knew of or was grossly negligent in making the nominal lender, the nominal lender

According to the statements in the Evidence Nos. 1 and 2 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da21330, Jan. 24, 2008). The Defendant divorced from D on Oct. 20, 2010; the Defendant is in high-level construction corporation from February 1, 2012 to December 1, 2012; and the Defendant is in high-level construction corporation from December 1, 2012 to July 1, 2013.