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(영문) 서울고등법원 2018.11.29 2018누63497
국가유공자요건비해당결정취소
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

Reasons

The court's explanation about this case is identical to the part concerning the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, in addition to the part concerning which appeal is made under Paragraph (2) below, and thus, it is citing it as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(1) In the first instance court, the first instance court’s rejection of the Defendant’s assertion, even if the evidence submitted in the first instance court was examined, is justifiable in its rejection of the Defendant’s assertion. In the third instance court’s decision, the first instance court’s “this court” in the first instance court’s decision, as well as the third instance court’s “the first instance court’s decision,” was adopted.

Article 4(1)6 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services to the State shall have a proximate causal relationship between education, training, or duty performance and injury or disease in order to fall under “an injury during education, training, or duty performance (including a disease in the line of duty)” of the first instance judgment No. 5 No. 10 and 11 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services to the State, and there should be a proximate causal relationship between education, training, or injury or disease (including a disease in the line of duty) in order to fall under a soldier or policeman on duty under Article 4(1)6 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services

In the first instance judgment, the part 6 of the first instance judgment, "if there exists the first medical treatment after the lapse of 21 years, it alone means the whole purport of the pleading in the statement No. 8," and the part 6 of the second instance judgment, which "if there is the first medical treatment for the first time after the lapse of 21 years, it shall be deemed that the plaintiff had received medical treatment under this name on October 2006 and January 2009, when 21 years have passed since the time when the plaintiff was discharged from the military in light of the health insurance benefits of the plaintiff from January 200 to January 20, 209, it shall be deemed that the whole of the hearing in the case of the kins that were limited to the

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