1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance concerning the instant case is that “The representative of the management body of the instant aggregate building shall be the chairman of the management body of the instant aggregate building” in Section 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance, “The representative of the management body of the instant aggregate building was elected on September 15, 2014,” and the part 3 to 7 and 15 are the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the reexamination of the said part as follows. Therefore, this is cited pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

In other words, the defendant assumes that he is the president even though the term of office of the management body was terminated on September 15, 2015, and caused such abuse of authority or tort, and accordingly, the plaintiff suffered damages of KRW 4,000,000, such as penalty for breach of authority under the lease contract in this case (it is not clear that the plaintiff's ground for claim exists, but it seems that he claims damages of KRW 2 million, KRW 500,000,000 for penalty for breach of the lease contract, KRW 1,50,000,000 for consolation money, and KRW 1.5 million for consolation money)

B. In addition to the aforementioned evidence and the testimony of the witness E of the party, the term of office of executive officers, such as the president of the management body, has been set at one year under the management rules of the instant aggregate building, and the term of office of the defendant elected by the president of the management body on September 15, 2014, expired on September 15, 2015, when D entered into a lease agreement with the Plaintiff on subparagraph 206 of the instant aggregate building and visited E to the head of the management office for the interior work, there is a restriction on the same type of business in the instant aggregate building store to D when E visits the head of the management office for the interior work, and the academic research institute (304) is already operating within the instant aggregate building, and each of the above facts can be acknowledged.

However, the evidence presented by the plaintiff alone asserts that during that process, the defendant abused his authority and directly or through the Director E is a violation of the same trade restriction to D who leased the instant building 206.