In a case where Party A, while entering into an automobile insurance contract with Party B with respect to one’s own automobiles, caused a traffic accident by driving an insured vehicle at night, shocking the central separation zone, etc., and claimed Party B against Party B for damage, such as the severe damage of the insured vehicle, and Party B claimed that Party A was exempted from insurance money for self-motor vehicle damage in accordance with the terms and conditions of exemption from drinking driving insurance contract, the case holding that Party A’s duty to pay the insurance money for self-motor vehicle damage is exempted, on the ground that Party A’s act of driving at the time of the accident, etc. is confirmed to have been in a state of alcohol level of not less than 0.05% in light of all the circumstances such as the conduct of the accident, etc.

In a case where Party A, while entering into an automobile insurance contract with Party B with respect to one’s own automobiles, caused a traffic accident by driving an insured vehicle at night, shocking the central separation zone, etc., and Party B claimed that Party B was exempted from insurance money for self-motor vehicle damage in accordance with the terms and conditions of exemption from drinking driving insurance contract, the case holding that Party A’s non-prosecution disposition was not taken in the relevant criminal case until the accident occurred, on the grounds that Party A failed to measure the blood alcohol level at the wind of leaving the scene after the accident, and it was impossible to apply the dmark formula, but it was difficult to obtain the exemption from insurance money at the time of the accident in light of the following circumstances: Party A’s behavior and communication between Party A and the driver’s appraiser’s opinion on the speed and location of the accident at the time of the accident, Party A’s maximum convenience after the accident, Party A’s accident after drinking alcohol level, Party A’s duty to obtain exemption from insurance money and 5% alcohol level at the time of the accident.

Articles 659, 726-2, Article 44 of the Road Traffic Act

Plaintiff (Law Firm Taesan, Attorneys Jin-jin et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

State Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm just Law, Attorneys Park hee-hee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

February 8, 2017

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

From September 9, 2012, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff 3,187,376 won and the amount calculated by applying the rate of 5% per annum from September 9, 2012 to the service date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim and the cause of the claim in this case, and 15% per annum from the next day to the date of complete payment. The Defendant confirms that the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff KRW 74,90,000 for self-vehicle damage insurance money under the eYuu Cirex Insurance Contract concluded on June 21, 2012.

1. Basic facts

(a) Automobile insurance;

1) On June 21, 2012, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant, an insurance company, on the part of the policyholder and the insured for the eYucle 10D Luxury Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “Plaintiffs Motor Vehicles”) on the part of the contractor and the insured (hereinafter “the instant insurance”).

Examining the part related to the instant insurance among the coverage of the instant insurance, one’s own physical accident is divided into death, injury, and disability. Of them, the amount of insurance coverage is KRW 15 million, and the amount of insurance coverage for one’s own vehicle damage is KRW 74,90,000. In the case of the instant insurance claim for one’s own vehicle damage, the right of pledge has been established in the new card for the instant insurance contract. The value of the Plaintiff’s vehicle is KRW 74,90,000 in the insurance policy.

2) The terms and conditions of the instant insurance are as follows.

(1) The insurance company shall provide for the following insurance coverage by item Ⅱ. 1/1 of its own physical injury: (1) the insured shall compensate for losses caused by the death or injury of the insured. (2) The insurance proceeds paid by the insurance company to its own physical injury shall be as follows: (1) the amount of insurance coverage shall be limited to the insurance coverage on the table of the amount of injury (1) the insurance coverage of the insured [2] (1) the number of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured (2) the number of damages caused by the death or the number of damages caused by the accident, 3) the insurance coverage shall be calculated in accordance with the following methods: (3) the amount of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured (2) the number of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured; (1) the amount of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured; (2) the amount of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured; (3) the amount of damages caused by the death or injury of the insured shall not be covered by the insurance policy:

[1] 【26】

2)Definitions 4

3) The Road Traffic Act prohibits a driver from driving under the influence of alcohol (Article 44(1)), while the standard of the state of under the influence of alcohol prohibited is not less than 0.05% of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration (Article 44(4)).

(b) Occurrence of a traffic accident;

On September 9, 2012, the Plaintiff driven the Plaintiff’s vehicle, while driving the Plaintiff’s vehicle at around 00:29, and driving the two-lane from each side of the two-lanes to the right side of the Yannam-gun, Haan-gun, Sinnam-gu, Sinnam-si, is proceeding, and the direction of the Plaintiff’s own driving is rapidly changed to the left side, one lane has passed, and the Plaintiff shocked the central separation zone on the left side of the front side of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, and followed the direction to the right side by changing the direction to the right side of the Plaintiff’s driving direction again (hereinafter “instant accident”). (The next accident”).

Due to the instant accident, the Plaintiff suffered bodily injury, such as pressure duplicating 1st century, and the Plaintiff’s vehicle was destroyed.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 4, 9 through 12, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 11 through 14 (including virtual numbers), the purport of the whole pleadings and arguments

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff asserts as follows as the cause of the claim.

① A claim for insurance proceeds from a self-physical accident: The Plaintiff sustained injury under class 2 of class 2 due to the instant accident, and thus, the insurance proceeds from a self-physical accident (injury) in accordance with the instant insurance contract and the terms and conditions of the instant contract shall be calculated as business suspension damage and consolation money. Of these, insurance proceeds corresponding to business suspension damage shall be KRW 1,427,376, equivalent to 80 percent of the actual reduced import amount of the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms and conditions [ [ [25]-B-3-A] of the terms and conditions. Insurance proceeds corresponding to consolation money shall be KRW 1,760,00 corresponding to class 2 of class 2 [25] of the terms and conditions [25]-B-2]. The Defendant sought payment of KRW 3,187,376 in total and delay damages.

② A claim for confirmation of the duty to pay insurance money for self-vehicle damage: The Plaintiff’s vehicle was in the state of full loss at the level of automobile-scrapping due to the instant accident. Of the instant insurance, since the part on self-vehicle damage is valued insurance, the assessed amount of KRW 74,90,000,000,000, is the insured amount. The instant accident occurred due to the Plaintiff’s stroke driving, and thus, the Defendant

B. Defendant’s assertion

① With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for insurance proceeds from one’s own physical accident: The instant accident is the Plaintiff’s fault without any third party’s intervention, and thus, the mutual aid fund stipulated in the terms and conditions is not appropriated in calculating the insurance proceeds from one’s own physical accident. Therefore, the partial insurance proceeds should be calculated only in the amount equivalent to the medical expenses. As such, the Plaintiff cannot claim the amount equivalent to the amount of business suspension damage and consolation money as

② With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for confirmation of the insurance proceeds from self-vehicle damage in the instant insurance: (a) the Plaintiff, a pledger, cannot exercise his/her right directly as to the insurance proceeds from his/her own vehicle damage; (b) this part of the insurance in the instant insurance is unlawful as the Plaintiff has no standing to sue. This part of the claim is not a valued insurance, and the Plaintiff’s vehicle is not in the state of full-time loss; and (c) thus, in order for the Plaintiff to claim the insurance proceeds from his/her own vehicle damage, the Plaintiff must prove the amount computed by deducting the automobile scrap from the exchange price of the Plaintiff (negative). The Plaintiff performed a drunk driving in a state of blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.05% and caused the instant accident. Therefore, the part of the insurance proceeds from his/her own vehicle damage in the instant insurance is exempted from liability [15] [7]-1-(7)--16],

3. Determination as to a claim for insurance proceeds from a self-physical accident

As seen earlier, the terms and conditions of the insurance of this case [1]-1-(3) and / [25] -B] provide that insurance proceeds from a self-physical accident (injury) shall be calculated by deducting the amount of deduction from the amount of actual damage consisting of active damage (rescue search expenses, treatment relation expenses), consolation money, temporary closure damage, and other items of damage compensation, but if the amount of deduction does not occur, the insurance proceeds shall be calculated only by the medical expenses actually spent (including sex operation expenses) and the amount of deduction refers to the amount of compensation and the amount of compensation received from a third party other than the obligor.

In the instant case, the instant accident occurred when the Plaintiff driven the Plaintiff’s vehicle, and thereby, the Plaintiff sustained injury, such as the central separation zone and road studal pressure. In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff was unable to present the amount of deduction, namely, the amount of compensation for the personal injury of the automobile insurance, or the amount of compensation received from a third party other than the obligor for compensation, and the Plaintiff did not assert or prove any assertion as to the existence of the amount of such deduction. Accordingly, the insurance money of the self-physical accident (injury) based on the instant accident is limited to the medical expenses (including sexual surgery expenses) out of active damage, and does not constitute consolation money and business suspension damage.

Therefore, there is no ground to accept this part of the claim for consolation money and suspension of business as insurance money for self-physical accidents (injury) based on the insurance of this case.

4. Determination on the claim for confirmation of the duty to pay insurance money on self-vehicle damage

A. Determination on the main defense of this case

Article 352 of the Civil Code provides that a pledger cannot extinguish a right under the pledge without the consent of the pledgee or make any change detrimental to the rights of the pledgee. Accordingly, the pledger may not bring an action for performance of the right under the pledge. However, even if the pledger is a pledger, it is allowed to bring an action for confirmation for the interruption of extinctive prescription.

However, as in the instant case, the Plaintiff, a pledger, is not seeking the payment of the insurance money for self-vehicle damage based on the instant insurance, but merely seeking the confirmation of its payment obligation, it cannot be deemed unlawful with this part of the lawsuit.

Therefore, the defendant's main defense cannot be accepted.

B. Determination on the cause of the claim

Under the facts, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the insurance proceeds equivalent to his own vehicle damage as the insurance proceeds of this case. However, the judgment on whether the Plaintiff’s vehicle was in a state of full liability due to the accident of this case and whether the insurance of this case is a valued insurance shall be withheld.

C. Judgment on the defendant's defense of immunity

1) Facts of recognition

A) The Plaintiff’s occupation, etc.

The Plaintiff operates a manufacturer, such as gold-type, with the trade name “○○○○” in Changwon-si, Changwon-si ( Address omitted). The Plaintiff was punished for driving under the influence of alcohol in 2002 and 2007.

B) The Plaintiff’s movement to the instant accident

(1) On September 18, 2012, the day immediately before the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff driven the Plaintiff’s vehicle and parked the Plaintiff’s vehicle in the exclusive parking lot as “Dongghae-dong △△ Hospital” restaurant located adjacent to Msan-dong △△ Hospital (hereinafter referred to as “day-time operation”).

(2) At around 21:22 on that day, the Plaintiff parked the Plaintiff’s vehicle in a parking lot for the exclusive restaurant “○○○○○○” on the Plaintiff’s day, which was parked in a restaurant-only parking lot, with only one dong Nonparty 1, a large-scale non-party 2, and a branch 3). On the other hand, the Plaintiff parked the Plaintiff vehicle in a parking lot for a commercial building at around 21:31 (hereinafter referred to as “on the night operation”).

원고 차량에 장착된 블랙박스에는 야간운행 시 원고 차량 안에서 이루어진 대화가 녹음돼 있다. 그중 주요한 것은 ① 탑승자 중 1인의 “상주에 올라가서 술 한 잔 먹읍시다.”라는 말, ② 탑승자 중 1인의 “술먹으니까 숨이 차네.”라는 말, ③ 탑승자 중 다른 일행의 원고 차량을 두고 말하는 “6천만 원짜리도 작다”는 등의 말, ④ 이에 대하여 탑승자 중 1인의 “형님, 내 이거 수제하면서 진짜 실제 들은 돈은 1억 6천 들었다 아이가. 이거 차 뽑는데”, “내를 위해서 샀다 아이가. 내가 한번 타 보고 싶어가지고.”라고 대꾸하는 말, ⑤ 탑승자 중 1인의 “애 붙여드릴까요? 안 그러면 라이브카페를 갈까요?”라는 말, ⑥ 이에 대하여 다른 일행의 “그냥 맥주 한 잔 더 할란다.”라고 대꾸하는 말 등이다. 그중 ①, ④, ⑤는 동일인의 음성이다.

(3) 원고는 이 사건 사고 당일인 2012. 9. 9. 00:19 무렵 상가건물 주차장에 주차되어 있던 원고 차량에 혼자 탑승하여 운전을 시작한 뒤(다음부터 이 이후의 운행을 ‘이 사건 사고 운행’이라 한다) 일행들이 기다리던 상가건물 앞에서 잠시 정차하였다. 일행 중 1인이 열린 차창을 통하여 “진짜 괜찮은 거야?”라고 묻자 원고는 “예, 가이소.”라고 말하였고, 또 다른 1인이 “뭐? 음주운전해서 갈라꼬?”라고 말하자 원고는 혀가 꼬부라져 매우 불분명한 음성으로 “음주운전해서 가입시더.”라고 말하였다. 일행 중 1인이 “멀쩡하나? 괜찮나? 그럼 □□이보고 운전시켜, 차병원까지.”라고 말하였고, 다른 1인이 “□□이 운전시키고, 저기까지 가자, 그러면. ◇◇야!”라고 말하였으며, 처음 1인이 “◇◇야, 일나(일어나)!”라고 말하였으나, 원고는 그대로 다시 운전을 시작하였다.

(4) The Plaintiff continued to operate the instant accident on the following grounds: (a) around 00:29, around 10 minutes following the instant accident.

(5) On September 8, 2012, immediately before commencing the instant accident, the Plaintiff settled KRW 500,000 by credit card from an entertainment tavern, a entertainment drinking house, which was located in a commercial building where the Plaintiff parked the Plaintiff’s vehicle at night on September 8, 2012.

C) Circumstances immediately after the instant accident

The Plaintiff got out of the instant accident and went on the Plaintiff’s vehicle after approximately one minute. immediately after the instant accident, the police arrived at the site, but was left alone, and the Plaintiff was not found. The police went back to the new wall on the date of the instant accident, which confirmed the Plaintiff’s house and confirmed the Plaintiff’s absence of the house.

On September 10, 2012, 41 hours after the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff was admitted to the emergency room of △△△dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-si, Masan-si, and was hospitalized in the hospital until September 26, 2012. The Plaintiff was hospitalized in the hospital until September 26, 2012, and was subject to MaI test on September 12, 2012. The Plaintiff was subject to MaI test on September 12, 2012, and was subject to 1st century pressure and MaI test on injury, such as acute ethrosis and ethral ethic ethic ethic ethic ma.

D) The Defendant’s investigation of the instant accident

On September 11, 2012, after the previous framework of the instant accident, Nonparty 4’s employee Nonparty 4 investigated the Plaintiff as △△ Hospital hospitalized by the Plaintiff. In response, the Plaintiff stated the following outlines (No. 2).

On September 8, 2012, the day immediately before the instant accident, the Plaintiff was working at the company (○○○○), and all other employees left around around 21:0, and left a tobacco shop immediately after having come to the Plaintiff’s company. The Plaintiff did not drink prior to the instant accident. On September 9, 2012, the date of the instant accident, the Plaintiff started the company around 0:30, 200, while driving the Plaintiff her vehicle at the Gannam-gun-gun, and was working at the company (○○○○). The Plaintiff did not look at the instant mobile box to the extent that the Plaintiff got out of his mind immediately after the instant accident, but did not have arrived at the construction site of 0:50 meters away from the site of the instant accident, and the Plaintiff did not arrive at the construction site of 1:50 minutes after the instant accident.

However, the apartment construction site referred to by the Plaintiff was a dissenting part that exceeds the central separation zone at the site of the instant accident.

At △△△ Hospital, Nonparty 4 demanded the Plaintiff to sign by presenting the “Personal Information Processing Standard Consent”, and the Plaintiff returned to Nonparty 4, stating that “The Plaintiff’s vehicle involved in the accident will consent to the insurance company’s investigation, such as the Embag, safety level, and black image verification,” in the letter of consent.

E) Complaints against the Plaintiff and non-prosecution disposition by the Prosecutor

Upon receiving the claim from the Plaintiff, the Defendant filed a complaint against the Plaintiff on charges of attempted fraud.

(1) On December 3, 2012, the Plaintiff was investigated as the Defendant’s complaint at the Sinsan-dong Police Station of the Busan-dong Police Station, and stated the following outlines.

“The Plaintiff did not drink at all at the time of the instant accident. At the time of the commencement of the instant accident, the Plaintiff did not conclude that the Plaintiff was “at the time of his driving.” At the time of the instant accident, the Plaintiff driven the Plaintiff’s vehicle in order to go to the Haak-gun, Hakdong-gun, Hakdong-gun, Hakdong-gun, Hakdong-gun, by going through work at the office (○○○) at the latest prior to the instant accident, after going through work, and going to the mixed office, and was paid the instant accident.”

(2) On January 18, 2013, the Plaintiff stated the following summary at the Simsan-dong Police Station:

On September 8, 2012, the day before the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff left office (○○○○○) at around 24:0, and did not drink at all at that time. The Plaintiff thought that the instant accident did not have any person who wanted to drive a boomer, and that there was no other person to do so at the same time. However, the Plaintiff did not have any other person to do so at the same time during a few seconds of the instant accident. The Plaintiff was frightening the spirit, and the Plaintiff was frightened at the construction site of an apartment apartment with approximately 50 meters away from the mind, and the Plaintiff was frightened at the top of the fright, and frightened at the factory. The Plaintiff did not know that Nonparty 1 did not have any other person’s right to frighten in drinking, or who did not have any other person’s right to frighte in drinking. The Plaintiff did not know that he did not have any other person to fright in drinking.”

(3) On March 21, 2013, the Plaintiff stated the following summary at the branch office of the Changwon District Prosecutors’ Office in the Republic of Korea.

“원고는 이 사건 사고 직후 ‘사람을 받쳤나 싶어’ 차문을 열고 나왔는데 아무도 없었고, ‘뒷골이 빡 땡기더니’ 쓰러져 버렸다. 원고는 그 직후 불빛을 보고는 아파트 공사현장까지 포복자세로 기어갔다. 원고가 원고 차량을 살 때 영업사원이 블랙박스를 장착하여 원고에게 인도하였다. 원고가 경찰 수사단계에서 블랙박스 영상을 보았는데 “음주운전해서 가입시더”는 원고의 목소리가 맞다. 그러나 사회생활을 하면서 안 먹은 술도 먹었다고 할 수도 있고 사람이 선의의 거짓말을 대화 중에 할 수도 있다. 원고가 2012. 9. 8. 저녁 6시경 ‘동해장어구이’ 식당 주차장에 원고 차량을 주차했던 것은 원고가 평소 자주 튀김 등 군것질을 하거나 담배 사러 갈 때 그쪽으로 갔었기 때문이다. 원고가 저녁 6시경부터 9시경까지 원고 차량을 그곳에 계속 주차해 두었던 이유는 기억나지 않는다.”

(4) The prosecutor had the plaintiff state "for example," "for example," "for example," "for example, for driving a motor vehicle," and "for example, where anywhere any," among the voice recorded in the black box, and then requested the National Institute of Scientific Investigation and the Supreme Prosecutors' Office for Scientific Investigation to appraise where it is identical to the voice of the black box, but the results of each appraisal that could not be determined the same as the voice of the two voice.

The prosecutor, after the above appraisal results and the plaintiff's on-site after the accident of this case, found that the blood alcohol concentration is not measured due to leaving the plaintiff's on-site and thus it is impossible to apply the Madmark Official Form (No. 7349 of the original District Prosecutors' Office). (No. 2014 type No. 7349 of the original District Prosecutors' Office)

(f) Results of appraisal of the records of black boxes;

The results of appraisal of the contents of Nonparty 5's black box recording are as follows.

The voice of the Plaintiff’s end at around 00:19 on September 9, 2012, about 10 minutes prior to the instant accident, “Arrecker ...” or “Arhnk-down c.,” which reads “Arreck-down c.” or “Arhk-down c.,” is rarely 5) c.m., and there is no difference in concentration (concentration) between sound savings. In light of this, it is analyzed that the Plaintiff’s forced fishing power was partially lost at the time and the Plaintiff’s c.i., it was rarely difficult to c.m. at the time.

At the time of the instant accident, the Plaintiff’s absorption constitutes two times the average absorption and main operation of the general public, and thus, the correlation between alcohol and respiratory water is not significant.

At the time of the instant accident, the driving speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle constitutes approximately KRW 1.5 to KRW 2 times compared to the weekly operation. Moreover, at the time of the instant accident of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, approximately KRW 6 times compared to the weekly operation. In light of this, the Plaintiff’s ability to perceive the Plaintiff’s speed and maintain the lane is very deteriorated.

In all of the above 4 analysis items, the plaintiff is considered to be a drinking condition at the time of the accident of this case.

G) the driving ability decline effects and effects in accordance with the blood alcohol concentration;

The details of driving ability decline and effects according to the blood alcohol concentration on the “development of a program for education of driving knowledge and driving knowledge” conducted by the Road Traffic Safety Authority shall be as follows:

When 0.05% of the voting concentration (%) effects contained in the main text and 0.02-06 (1~2 remaining) - reduction of the speed estimate, reduction of lucence, reduction of 15% of the eyesight, reduction of 0.07-09 (3-5 remaining) of snow clock clock clock clock clock clock clock clock clock clock clance, first 0.08% or more of the total clock clock clock clock clance, second 3% or more of the total clock clock clock clock clock clance, second 40-50% of the total clock clock clock clock clock clock, second clock clock clock clock clock cl.

[Based on recognition] As a result of the appraisal of Gap's evidence Nos. 3 through 6, 8, Eul's evidence Nos. 2 through 10, 15, and 16 (including paper numbers) or video and sound, appraiser Nos. 5 and appraiser No. 5, the fact-finding to the Changwon District Court Mountainous District Court Mountainous District Court, the purport of the whole pleadings

[Judgment as to the ground for appeal of evidence] The plaintiff asserted that Eul evidence Nos. 3 and Eul evidence Nos. 7-1 through 9 were video or its stenographic records extracted from a stolen black box by the defendant, and this constitutes illegally collected evidence and thus it is not admissible, and the possibility of forgery cannot be ruled out. However, in the civil procedure procedure to which the principle of free evaluation of evidence is applied pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, it is not subject to the rule of exclusion of admissibility of illegally collected evidence pursuant to the legal principles under the Criminal Procedure Act, and there is no ground to view that each of the above evidence was forged (a change of content or a false preparation)

2) Determination

In full view of the above facts, it is sufficient to confirm that the Plaintiff was driving at a drinking state above 0.05% of blood alcohol level at the time of the instant accident. On the other hand, the prosecutor conducted a non-prosecution disposition on the premise of the Plaintiff’s drunk driving, but the same value of evidence as the criminal judgment finalized by the prosecutor’s non-prosecution disposition cannot be granted, and its purport is not sufficient to prove evidence in a criminal case based on strict proof unlike civil cases, and thus, it does not interfere with the ratification. The ratification is as follows.

First, around 18:00 on September 8, 2012, the day immediately before the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff’s wintered the Plaintiff’s vehicle to the restaurant “Dong Sea Fishing Implements” and parked it as it was for about three hours at least. At around 21:22, at around 21:19, the Plaintiff was parked again on the Plaintiff’s vehicle and parked it in the commercial building for night operation, and around three hours at around 0:19 on September 9, 2012, around 3 hours following the date of the instant accident.

On September 8, 2012, immediately before commencing the instant accident, the Plaintiff settled KRW 500,000 by credit card from the “Nlinno-ro shop”, which is an entertainment drinking house located in a commercial building where the Plaintiff parked the Plaintiff’s vehicle at night on September 8, 2012.

When the Plaintiff operates at night at around 21:22, it is evident that the Plaintiff’s statement (4-C-1)-B-2) ① through 6 conversations, it is evident that the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, and 1, who were in the middle of the above conversation, have discussed the place where the Plaintiff would continue to drink after drinking together. In particular, in light of the contents of ①, ④, and ⑤, of the same person’s voice, the Plaintiff, the owner of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, is bound to be the Plaintiff’s horse, and the Plaintiff played a leading role in moving the place to the place where the Plaintiff continues drinking.

When the Plaintiff started the operation of the instant accident on September 9, 2012, around 00:19, it is evident that the conversation recorded in the black box (4-C-1)-B-(3) is a conversation in which the Plaintiff and the daily behaviors have completed drinking and are taking a booming. In particular, in light of the fact that the Plaintiff was able to know about the Plaintiff’s drinking operation and presented other alternatives, it is reasonable to deem that both the Plaintiff and the daily activities were fully aware that the Plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol.

In full view of the following facts: (a) the Plaintiff left from around September 8, 2012 on the day immediately before the instant accident, and her behavior and words, it is sufficiently sufficient to deem that the Plaintiff had paid the price by credit card to have been paid by the Plaintiff.

Second, according to the appraiser non-party 5's appraisal results, it was found that the plaintiff was in a drinking state at the time of the accident of this case in all of the analysis items of the entertainment, absorption, driving speed, and the maximum convenience of the location of the location.

Third, the Plaintiff left the site immediately after the instant accident and concealed the end of the site. The Plaintiff, immediately after the instant accident, brought up his statement on the background, etc., and lost consciousness on September 7, 2012, “At around 15:00” (the Plaintiff’s statement at the time of investigation by Nonparty 4 of the Defendant’s employee Nonparty 4) or “Abrogate” (the Plaintiff’s statement at the Masan-dong Police Station at the Masan-dong Police Station on January 18, 2013), left the snow and went back to a four-lane road righting from the center of separation of the center. The Plaintiff was at a construction site of an apartment 50 meters away from the site of the instant accident, she was able to accept the Plaintiff’s behavior, such as pressing pressure, etc., due to the instant accident. However, it is difficult to accept the Plaintiff, even if it seems that the Plaintiff was suffering from a five-lane road due to a normal breakdown after the instant accident, such as the Plaintiff’s statement, etc.

In addition, the Plaintiff’s restoration of consciousness at the apartment construction site is not easy to leave the house immediately without seeking help from a hospital or a police station, etc., and it is more meaningful that the Plaintiff was placed in the emergency room of △△ Hospital even if the Plaintiff had to be hospitalized for 16 days due to the instant accident during the 16-day period after suffering from an injury, such as pressure of pressure at the 1st century, etc., of the instant accident, the Plaintiff was placed at the house, and only at around 09:00 on September 10, 2012, prepared a written statement by using the box at around 17:58 on that day. In other words, only after around 41 hours after the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff was placed in the emergency room of △△△ Hospital.

Meanwhile, according to the Defendant’s employee Nonparty 4’s demand, the Plaintiff prepared “Personal Information Processing Standard Consent” and stated that only the part pertaining to the confirmation of the video of the white scambling, the determination of whether to consent after legal verification, and the video of the black scam are not acceptable. However, this is also very exceptional behavior that is difficult to easily understand.

However, following the accident of this case, the plaintiff seems to have been well aware of the state of being punished for drunk driving in 2002 and 2007 due to the previous convictions that the plaintiff had been punished for drunk driving in 2002 and 2007, it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff had an intention to conceal it with his knowledge that the plaintiff was in a state of drinking enough to be subject to criminal punishment at the time of the accident of this case.

Fourth, after the accident of this case, the plaintiff was investigated by the non-party 4, who is an employee of the defendant, and the investigative agency, and therefore, it was difficult to obtain false statements and statements.

First of all, around 18:00 on September 8, 2012, the day immediately before the instant accident occurred, the Plaintiff continued to drink with Nonparty 1, etc. from that time, but continued to work for the company until the time immediately before the instant accident occurred during the police stage, and did not drink until the police stage. The Plaintiff made a false statement with Nonparty 1, etc. that he did not meet his own time. At the time of the commencement of the instant accident, the Plaintiff called “the time of the operation of the instant accident.” However, the Plaintiff was at the time of the commencement of the operation of the instant accident, which was “the time of the operation of the instant accident, during the police stage, was to deny it or exercise his right of silence, and then recognized it at the prosecution stage.

The Plaintiff asserted that it is difficult to understand that the Plaintiff was unable to understand that he was unable to know the existence despite being equipped with a black box from the time of killing the Plaintiff’s vehicle. At the investigation stage, the Plaintiff made a vindication that it was difficult for the Plaintiff to understand that he was unable to understand that he was unable to drive a drinking, or that he was unable to say that he was driving a drinking, because he was aware of the intention to drive a drinking, or that he was aware of the content of the black box at the time of the instant accident, while recognizing that he was the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff made a vindication that it was difficult to understand, such as “I would be able to drink a drinking while driving a drinking, and that he could have a bona fide speech during

As such, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s withdrawal of a defense that is difficult for the Plaintiff to obtain and make a false statement in many respects is due to the Plaintiff’s intention to conceal it by being aware of the fact that the Plaintiff was in a state of drinking that would be subject to criminal punishment at the time of the instant accident.

Fifth, the contents of the instant accident are as follows: (a) the Plaintiff’s vehicle proceeds in two lanes; (b) rapid change of the direction toward the port; (c) the Plaintiff’s front side of the Plaintiff’s front side of the vehicle cut off one-lane to the right side to the right side abutting on India by changing the direction to the right side to the right side; and (d) according to the appraiser Nonparty 5’s appraisal, the driving speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle at the time of the instant accident is about two times compared to the weekly operation; (b) the speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle at the time of the instant accident reaches about three times compared to the weekly operation. In full view of these, it is sufficiently recognized that the Plaintiff’s maximum part of the side location of the Plaintiff’s vehicle at the time of the instant accident reaches about three times compared to the daytime operation. In full view of these factors, it is sufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff’s blood alcohol concentration considerably exceeded 0% of his ability to normally operate the instant accident, such as balanced angle, spatial capability, mal angle, direction angle, and reaction.

In addition, at the time of the instant accident, the Plaintiff referred to as “a person who drives a motor vehicle while driving the motor vehicle” as “a person who is in a state of drinking.” The Plaintiff, at the time of the instant accident, can easily be seen that the Plaintiff was in a state of drinking, not a state of drinking, but a state of drinking, not a state of mere drinking.

3) Intermediate conclusion

Therefore, inasmuch as the Plaintiff is recognized to have been in a state of drinking more than 0.05% of blood alcohol level at the time of the instant accident, the obligation to pay insurance money for self-motor vehicle damage based on the insurance of this case is exempted pursuant to the terms and conditions of exemption [ [15]-1-(7)-//16) of the instant insurance, [17].

D. Sub-determination

As long as the defendant's defense of exemption is accepted, the remaining part of the issue is without need to be examined, the plaintiff's claim to confirm the plaintiff's obligation to pay insurance money for self-vehicle damage is without merit.

5. Conclusion

For this reason, the plaintiff's claim is rejected.

The effect of judge's species;

Note 1) seems to be the mistake of / [27]

Note 2) seems to have been erroneous in regard to “three months”.

Note 3) Although the record is not clear, it appears to be Nonparty 3 of the factory head of ○○○○○.

4) Whether the Plaintiff actually stated “15.00” or whether the Plaintiff’s actual statement was “03.00” is unclear as to whether Nonparty 4 was erroneous.

Note 5) Characteristics characteristics the spectrum. The analysis of a person’s sound as a frequency leads to a specific spectrum depending on the difference in the frequency. For example, anyone “A” and “A” regardless of the nature of sound. This is because the spectrum of “A” consists of the distribution of the same spectrum regardless of the sound of any person. As can be seen, the distribution of the spectrum of a person’s sound refers to the distribution of the spectrum of a person, and is called from the top of the lower top of the frequency indicated by the picture to its frequency.

Note 6) as a part of a distance distance between the left-hand line and the center line of the vehicle, the degree of the vehicle is expressed on the left-hand side.

Note 7) As seen earlier, there is a possibility of the mistake of “03:00.”