1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff corresponding to the money ordered to be paid below shall be revoked.

1. The following facts may be acknowledged, without dispute between the parties, by taking into account Gap evidence Nos. 1 to 8, Eul evidence Nos. 1 to 1, Eul evidence No. 1, Eul evidence No. 1 to 4, Eul evidence No. 1 (including the serial numbers), the results of the inquiry and reply to the inquiry of facts to the Daegu North Korean Certified Judicial Scriveners Association at the court of the first instance, and the whole purport of the pleadings.

J on May 3, 2007, K 801 (hereinafter “instant building”) was leased to the Plaintiff on May 3, 2007 by setting the lease deposit amount of KRW 92,00,000,000 and the lease term of KRW 92,00,00 from May 3, 2007 to May 24, 2009.

On June 25, 2007, the Plaintiff obtained a fixed date under the above lease agreement, and completed the move-in report on the same day.

B. After the J died on September 7, 2010, the Plaintiff subrogated on November 24, 2010 to the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation the amount of KRW 54,000,000 for the principal and interest of loans on March 30, 2004, and on November 30, 2010, transferred the instant building, which is a security right to the said loans, from the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation.

C. On October 6, 2011, Seoul Guarantee Insurance Co., Ltd. applied for a compulsory auction on the instant building with Daegu District Court racing support L. On October 7, 201, the above execution court rendered a decision to commence compulsory auction on the instant building on October 7, 201, and on the same day, the registration of the decision to commence compulsory auction was completed.

The Plaintiff, the mortgagee of the right to collateral security, received a peremptory notice from the above execution court on October 11, 201, stating that “the existence of a claim, its cause, and details of the amount, shall be reported by December 30, 201, which is the final period for demanding the distribution.”

Meanwhile, the Plaintiff, who is the lessee of the instant building, received a notice from the said executing court on October 24, 201, stating that “the demand for distribution by December 30, 201, which is the final period for demand for distribution,” the Plaintiff received a notice from the said executing court.

However, the Plaintiff did not demand a distribution as a lessee until December 30, 201, which is the final period for demand for distribution.

This is followed by the plaintiff.