The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (unfair sentencing) of the lower court’s sentencing (the completion of a sexual assault treatment program for two and forty years and forty hours of imprisonment) is excessively unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition to these circumstances, in light of the appellate court’s ex post facto and in-depth nature, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing in the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentence of sentencing in the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015) by destroying the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence of sentencing in the first instance is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the ground that the Defendant was a juvenile under the age of 17 at the time when the instant crime was committed, and that there was no history of punishment for sexual crimes, etc., that the Defendant was forced the victim to engage in sexual traffic, and did not receive a reasonable punishment.

I am.