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대전고등법원 2018.08.17 2018노263

특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(알선수재)

Text

All appeals by the defendant and the prosecutor are dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentencing of the lower court (unfair sentencing) (2 years of suspended sentence in October, and additional collection) is too unreasonable.

B. The lower court’s sentencing (unfair sentencing) is unreasonable as it is too unhued.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, but is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court, based on its stated reasoning, sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the grounds of the sentencing as stated in its reasoning, such as: (a) the Defendant was led to the confession and reflect of the offense; and (b) the Defendant returned the entire amount of good offices to the donor; and (c) the Defendant’s trust in the performance of duties of the public official; and (d) the lower court’s reasonable scope of sentencing.