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(영문) 대법원 2019.03.28 2019도96
자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률위반
Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant A’s grounds of appeal, Article 178(1)1 of the former Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (amended by Act No. 15549, Mar. 27, 2018; hereinafter “former Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act”) prohibits Defendant A from using unlawful means, schemes, or tricks in connection with trading and other transactions of financial investment instruments. Article 443(1)8 of the former Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act provides that a person who commits the said act shall be punished.

Here, the term “illegal means, schemes, or tricks” refers to any means, schemes, or tricks which are deemed to be unfair by social norms.

At this time, it is necessary to consider the risk of undermining the fairness, reliability, and efficiency of the capital market by hindering fair competition and causing other investors to make wrong judgments.

In addition, Article 178(2) of the former Capital Markets Act prohibits the dissemination of rumors and the use of deceptive schemes for the purpose of trading or any other transaction of financial investment instruments or for the purpose of facilitating a fluctuation in the market price. Article 443(1)9 of the former Capital Markets Act provides that a person who commits such an act shall be punished.

Here, the term "manner" refers to means, plans, tricks, etc. for the purpose of inducing a certain act by deceiving a trading partner or an unspecified investor.

(See Supreme Court Decision 201Do8109 Decided October 27, 2011, and Supreme Court Decision 2013Do6962 Decided April 12, 2018, etc.). The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, convicted Defendant A of the facts charged (excluding the part not guilty in the grounds for appeal) against Defendant A.

The judgment below

Examining the reasoning in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court erred by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by exceeding the bounds of the said principle.

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