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(영문) 대구고등법원 2016.09.01 2016노130
아동ㆍ청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(유사성행위)등
Text

1. The part of the judgment of the first instance and the judgment of the second instance concerning the defendant's case shall be reversed.

2. The defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for three years.

Reasons

1. As to the instant case against the Defendant, the lower court: (a) declared a guilty verdict regarding the part of the Defendant’s case; and (b) dismissed the prosecutor’s request regarding the part regarding the claim for probation order; and (c) only the Defendant appealed, there is no benefit of appeal as to the part regarding the claim for probation order.

Therefore, notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 21-8 and 9(8) of the Act on Probation and Electronic Monitoring, etc. of Specific Criminal Offenders, the part of the request for probation order is excluded from the scope of this court's trial. Therefore, the scope of this court's trial is limited to the part of the first and second court's judgment

2. The summary of the grounds for appeal (p. 1 and 2 years of imprisonment by each of the original courts) is too unreasonable.

3. Ex officio determination

A. Each judgment of the court below against the consolidated defendant was rendered, and each defendant filed an appeal against them, and this court decided to jointly examine the above appeal cases. Since each of the offenses of the court below is concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, one of the offenses of the court below should be sentenced pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act, the part of the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court of second instance

B. Of the judgment of the court below of the second instance, Article 2(2) of the facts charged by the court below as to the distribution of obscene materials 1) of the 2012 indictment No. 2, the Defendant requested that the Defendant take and send an additional photograph of the victim K even if he had already been transmitted a chest exposure photograph from the victim K before the victim’s non-permanent place, but refused this request, and the victim refused this request, and distributed child and juvenile pornography by transmitting the victim’s chest image to L (the age 11) who is the offender of the victim (the age 11) who became aware of through the victim’s J, by cell phone text message.

B. Article 2 (3) of the facts charged by the lower court

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