All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Article 26-3(4) of the Harbor Transport Business Act (amended by Act No. 15011, Oct. 31, 2017); newly established Article 26-3(4) of the said Act provides, “No vessel fuel supply vessel (limited to a vessel that is not subject to the restriction on its navigation section) registered as an inland cargo transport business pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Sea Transportation Business Act shall be subject to the restriction on its business territory.” The instant facts charged constitute “where the instant act does not constitute a crime due to the alteration of law after the crime” under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, and thus, the Defendants should be acquitted.

B. According to Article 26-3(1) and Article 31(1) of the former Harbor Transport Business Act (amended by Act No. 14511, Dec. 27, 2016; hereinafter “former Harbor Transport Business Act”), asserting that it is unconstitutional, a person who intends to engage in vessel oil supply business shall register with the head of a regional marine fishery office for each harbor, and a person who engages in vessel oil supply business at an unregistered port, in violation of the registered matters, shall be punished by a person who engages in vessel oil supply business at the same time. However, applying the aforementioned provision to a vessel oil supplier who engages in coastal cargo transport business and vessel oil supply business at the same time, is unconstitutional.

(c)

The purport of the Marine Affairs Department’s reply to the inquiry on January 28, 2015 and the inquiry on January 10, 2006, which is the competent authority to claim errors in law, is that “if a domestic cargo transportation business entity and a oil supplier are the same, it is possible to pay off vessels other than registration, it is possible to do so.” In the event that a domestic cargo transportation business and a ship oil supplier are registered at the same time, the same act as stated in the facts charged in the instant case does not constitute a crime permitted under statutes.

Since the misunderstanding is recognized and the misunderstanding is justified, the defendants cannot be punished in accordance with Article 16 of the Criminal Code.

2. Determination

A. We examine the assertion of acquittal, and Article 1. of the Criminal Act.