1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

1. The court's explanation of this case is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the following parts, thereby citing it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. On the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, the letter No. 4, No. 21, No. 5, No. 1 shall be followed as follows.

[Reasons for Recognition] In the absence of dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19, each statement of evidence Nos. 3 and 4, each statement of evidence Nos. 3 and 4, the whole purport of the pleading, and the whole purport of the argument No. 7 of the judgment of the court of first instance, "attached Form No. 2, 3, and 4" shall be written as "attached

The 7th sentence of the first instance judgment, the 16th to 8th sentence, shall be followed as follows.

C. 1) Where an industrial accident is caused by a joint tort committed by an insured and a third party, if the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service can claim the total amount of insurance benefits against a third party, it becomes a circular lawsuit, and the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service claims in this case to return it to the insured, which is not reasonable in light of the good faith principle, the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service should interpret that the amount equivalent to the fault ratio of the insured against the third party is not feasible. Specifically, the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service should interpret that the amount equivalent to the fault ratio of the insured against the third party cannot be claimed. Specifically, the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service can claim for the difference only in the case where there is a difference after deducting the amount equivalent to the fault ratio of the insured among the damages to be compensated

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 200Da62322 delivered on March 21, 2002, etc.) (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2000Da62322, Mar. 21, 2002) and the rubberer of this case derived from the rops that were unusable from the ammunition management department of the Ministry of National Defense. As such, the Defendant was sufficiently aware of the possibility that dangerous substances remain in the rubberer