1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant is modified as follows.

The defendant is attached to the plaintiffs.

1. The reasons for this part of the underlying facts are as follows, except for the dismissal or addition of part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance (Articles 4 and 10, 9, and 16, respectively) is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance. As such, this part shall be cited in accordance with the main sentence of

In Part 4, "Defendant P" in Part 13 means "Co-Defendant P of the first instance trial (hereinafter referred to as "P"), and each "Defendant P" in Part 14, 16-17, 21, 7-8, 8, 8, 21, 21, 9, and 9 are described as "P".

Defendant V (hereinafter “Defendant V”) in Part 16 of the first instance court’s 16 test is as follows: “The co-Defendant Q (hereinafter “ Q”) in Q.”

Part 4 deleted from Part 17 to Part 18.

No. 6 table No. 13 of the “the content of the Jeonsesese Agreement” refers to “the remaining amount of KRW 40,000,000” as “the remaining amount of KRW 50,00,000.”

Following the 7th page “C.” of the 7th page, the Plaintiff C received KRW 5,00,000,000 out of the deposit for lease on a deposit basis around July 2016.

The following shall be added between conduct 14 and 15:

A person shall be appointed.

E. The Plaintiffs’ occupied Plaintiffs paid the security deposit in accordance with each of the instant lease contracts, and thereafter possess each of the Plaintiff’s occupied parts listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “each of the instant occupied parts”) until now.

A person shall be appointed.

2. Determination

A. 1 Plaintiffs asserted by the parties, as the Defendant comprehensively delegated P with the authority to lease and manage buildings and receive deposits, etc., they should be held liable as parties to the contract in relation to the return of deposit for lease, and if they granted P the authority to represent monthly rental contracts, only to P.

Even if P acted as an agent in excess of the authority based on the basic power of representation, and the plaintiffs have justifiable grounds to believe that P has the right to enter into the obligatory right of lease on a deposit basis.