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1. Based on the D/D Joint Office of Notaries Public No. 4494 of 2006, the Defendant attached on June 9, 2015.
Reasons
1. Facts of recognition;
A. On October 15, 2013, the Plaintiff entered into a monetary loan agreement with Nonparty E by setting the interest rate of KRW 5 million per annum, and by October 15, 2018 due date. The Plaintiff transferred the Plaintiff’s ownership of the attached list owned by E (hereinafter “instant corporeal movables”) by means of possession revision for the purpose of securing the performance of the said loan obligation, and the notary public entered the notarial deed as the Daejeon General Law Firm, No. 915, 2014.
B. The Defendant applied for compulsory execution against the instant corporeal movables by the Daejeon District Court 2015No. 22399 on the basis of a notarial deed No. 4494, 2006 against the husband C, and completed the attachment execution on June 9, 2015.
[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1 and 2 evidence, purport of the whole pleadings
2. If a security agreement on a movable property is concluded and a mortgagee obtains delivery by means of possession or alteration, even before completing the liquidation procedure, the mortgagee is not entitled to use or benefit from the collateral, but may exercise his/her right by asserting that he/she is the owner of the collateral in a relationship with a third party.
(See Supreme Court Decision 93Da44739 delivered on August 26, 1994). According to the above facts, the corporeal movables in this case are presumed to be jointly owned property of E and C, which is between the husband and wife, and the Plaintiff could have concluded a security agreement on the corporeal movables in this case and received delivery by means of possession or amendment. Thus, even if the Plaintiff, a mortgagee, did not enjoy profit from the corporeal movables in this case, the corporeal movables in the external relationship with the Defendant are deemed to be owned by the Plaintiff. Thus, the Defendant’s compulsory execution against the corporeal movables in the instant case owned by a third party, which is not the execution obligor, based on the above corporeal deed against C, should be denied as it is unlawful.
3. Thus, the plaintiff's conclusion is that of this case.