All appeals filed by the defendant and prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentence imposed by the lower court (one year of imprisonment, 40 hours of order, three years of employment restriction order, confiscation, additional collection KRW 11,354,362) is too unreasonable.

B. Prosecutor 1) Nos. 3 [ggal juS8 (SM-G950N)] that was omitted from the sentence of confiscation is a product provided by the Defendant for a crime and subject to confiscation, but the lower court erred by omitting the sentence of confiscation. 2] The above sentence imposed by the lower court of unfair sentencing is too uneasible and unfair.

2. Determination

A. Since the confiscation under Article 48(1) of the Criminal Act is discretionary to determine the assertion of omission of a declaration of forfeiture, whether to confiscate even an article that meets the requirements of forfeiture is left to the court’s discretion.

(2) In light of the aforementioned legal principles and evidence duly adopted by the court below and the court below, the evidence No. 3 [SM-G950N] seized by the investigative agency can be deemed as falling under the confiscation requirement because the defendant provided the criminal act of this case. However, the following circumstances acknowledged by each of the above evidence are acknowledged as follows: ① No. 3 is not used only for the criminal act of this case, ② is an object used for other purposes, ② if evidence No. 3 is not confiscated, it is difficult to readily conclude that the defendant is highly likely to repeat a crime by using the evidence, the court below’s failure to confiscate it cannot be deemed unlawful.

This part of the Prosecutor's argument is without merit.

B. The Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle on the argument of unfair sentencing by the defendant and the prosecutor, has an inherent area in the sentencing of the first instance court. As such, in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion,