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(영문) 대구지방법원 2019.05.22 2018나309581
토지인도
Text

1. All appeals filed by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall consist of a principal lawsuit and a counterclaim.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance concerning the instant case is as follows: (a) further determination of the Plaintiff’s argument at the trial of the court of first instance as to the Plaintiff’s assertion in paragraph (2); and (b) addition of evidence No. 11 to No. 14 submitted to the court of first instance as evidence insufficient to view that the Defendant’s presumption of independent possession was reversed; (c) the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated (except for the part concerning the main counterclaim that does not fall under the scope of the judgment of the court of first instance).

2. Additional determination

A. The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the possession of the instant dispute portion is the possession of a third party in the nature of the title of possession, since it is gratuitously used with the consent of the Plaintiff in return for the return of the share transferred to F among forest G 20,232 square meters that the Defendant and the Defendant’s attached F purchased with the Plaintiff’s funds to the Plaintiff.

It is not sufficient to recognize that the defendant and his her son used the part of the dispute in this case as compensation for the return of the above ownership shares by only the statement of Gap evidence No. 14, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

The plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

B. The Plaintiff asserts that the presumption of autonomous possession was broken in light of the fact that the Defendant did not complete the registration of ownership transfer concerning the dispute of this case despite the opportunity for registration several times under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer (hereinafter “Special Measures Act”).

In light of the above facts, D owned the land of this case in an unregistered state on November 5, 197, and after D died on and around September 16, 1980, the Plaintiff, which was its children, made registration of ownership preservation in its name in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Land of this case on September 16, 1980. The Defendant from November 20, 1977 to the ground of this case.

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