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(영문) 광주지방법원 2019.12.24 2019가단12546
청구이의
Text

1. On July 21, 2005, the Defendant’s Gwangju District Court Decision 2005Gaso20325, the lease deposit case against the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. On July 5, 2005, the defendant filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff for the claim for the return of lease deposit with the Gwangju District Court 2005Da20325, Jul. 21, 2005, "the plaintiff (the plaintiff of this case) shall pay to the plaintiff (the plaintiff of this case) 5,827,012 won and the amount calculated by the rate of 20% per annum from the following day of delivery of the complaint to the day of full payment" (hereinafter "the decision of execution recommendation of this case"). This decision was finalized on August 11, 2005 (Evidence A, the evidence of this court, the purport of arguments, the whole purport of arguments), and the claims based on the decision of execution recommendation of this case (hereinafter "the claims of this case") have expired after August 11, 2015.

Unless there are special circumstances, compulsory execution based on the decision on execution recommendation of this case cannot be permitted as illegal.

I would like to say.

2. As to this, the Defendant filed an application against the Plaintiff on July 13, 2010 with the Gwangju District Court 2010Kao4468 (hereinafter “instant application to specify the property”). On August 18, 2010, the same court rendered a decision that “the Plaintiff shall submit a list of property specifying its property status to the Plaintiff,” and on September 10, 2010, the Defendant asserted that the statute of limitations on the instant claim was interrupted by the instant application to specify the pertinent property.

3. Therefore, even if the Defendant filed an application for the presentation of the instant property against the Plaintiff and the subsequent decision was served on the Plaintiff, which is the debtor, this is only effective as a “peremptory” which is the grounds for interrupting extinctive prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Da26198, Dec. 13, 2018). Thus, the procedure prescribed by Article 174 of the Civil Act, such as filing a lawsuit again within six months from that time, or seizing or provisionally seizing the instant property.

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