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(영문) 전주지방법원 2019.05.08 2019노281
특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(도주치상)등
Text

The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (one year of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution, two years of probation, 80 hours of social service, 40 hours of compliance driving course) of the lower court is deemed to be too uneasy and unfair;

2. Determination

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the matters that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and that the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). B.

As to the instant case, it is difficult to evaluate that there was a change in the sentencing conditions compared to the original judgment even if normal data submitted by the health team and the trial court were considered, and there is no record of having been sentenced to a decision of suspending the execution of imprisonment due to the crime of drunk driving, including the following: (a) the fact that the Defendant had committed a motor vehicle accident while driving a drunk, and the nature of the crime was poor; (b) the Defendant did not agree with the victims except for E among the victims of the instant case until now; and (c) the Defendant had been sentenced to a decision of suspending the execution of imprisonment due to the crime of drunk driving; (b) the Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of the instant crime is not very high; (c) the degree of injury suffered by the victims due to the instant traffic accident is not excessive; (d) the Defendant agreed with the victim E during the trial process of the original trial; and (e

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