The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The lower court, on November 22, 2013, indicated the following as the “act of transferring the possession of the instant building to Defendant B and I (hereinafter “act of around November 22, 2013”), in collusion with Defendant A, B, and D (hereinafter “act of around December 22, 2013”), the lower court indicated the “act of around December 30, 2013.”

D) A disposition of the gold price prior to the possession of the instant case (the Daejeon District Court Order 2013 Ma3632 dated October 17, 2013, 2013) was effective, but the Defendant C conspiredd to do the said act.

There is no evidence to determine the person, and the lower court, in collusion with Defendant A, B, D, and C on November 30, 2013, indicated the act of transferring the possession of the instant building to Defendant C (hereinafter “act around November 30, 2013”), as “crime around January 17, 2014.”

D) The lower court determined that the gold price prior to the possession of the instant case was not guilty on the ground that it was an act subsequent to the truth by impairing the utility of the disposition indication.

However, the Defendants’ act around November 30, 2013 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendants’ act was not merely an ex post facto act, on the grounds that the land price for the obstruction of possession of the instant case, which was separate from the disposition of the gold price prior to the possession of the instant case, has undermined the utility of the indication (Seoul District Court Order 2013Kahap 131 dated December 16, 2013).

The reason for the prosecutor's appeal does not include the assertion that Defendant C conspireds for the conduct on November 22, 2013.

2. Determination

A. On November 30, 2013, the prosecutor asserts that the Defendants’ act would impair the effectiveness of the disposition of the land price that was separate from the disposition of the gold price prior to the possession of the instant case, and thus, the Defendant’s act constitutes “the Defendants’ act would impair the effectiveness of the disposition mark.” However, the facts charged are interpreted only to the effect that the Defendants’ act, around November 30, 2013, undermined the effectiveness of the disposition mark.”

B. Even if the facts charged were to be construed as “around November 30, 2013, the Defendants’ act of around November 30, 2013 would have impaired the utility of the disposition mark,” the Defendants’ act of around November 30, 2013 would be subject to the disposition of the price interference with the possession of the instant case.