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1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. The details of the disposition are as follows: (a) the tourism channel of sojourn status on March 29, 2017 (B-2) the date of entry into the Republic of Korea of the U.S. on March 29, 2017 and (b-2) the date of application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on April 28, 2017 (hereinafter “the date of application for refugee status recognition”): The facts that there is no ground for rejection of the decision made on March 21, 2018 on June 20, 2017; (b) the facts that there is no ground for rejection of the decision made on March 21, 2018, as of the date of application for objection, and the purport of the entire pleadings as a whole.
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The Plaintiff’s assertion is a member of the Egypt Republic of Egypt (hereinafter “Egypt”) who is a national and B organization.
The Egypt Government has defined B organizations as terrorist organizations and stuffed its members.
Accordingly, the plaintiff has been in the Republic of Korea regardless of Egypt.
If the plaintiff returned to Egypt, he/she is likely to be stuffed on the ground that he/she is a member of the B organization.
B. Determination 1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines a refugee as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to a well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a foreigner who does not want to be protected, or who, due to such fear, cannot return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she had resided before entering the Republic of Korea.” 2) In full view of the evidence and evidence as mentioned in subparagraph 3 as well as the following circumstances revealed by adding the purport of the pleading to the statement in subparagraph 3, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff “a well-founded fear of being injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion,” and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise.