The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for six months.

Provided, That the above punishment shall be imposed for one year from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., imprisonment with prison labor for six months and one year of suspended execution) of the lower court is too unreasonable;

2. Determination

A. Article 59-3(1) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, which uniformly provided for the restriction on employment of persons with disabilities for the ten-year period for children, juveniles, or adults, was amended by Act No. 15904 on December 11, 2018, and Article 59-3(1) and (2) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities provides that the court shall separately determine the period of restriction on employment within a ten-year period in consideration of the risk of recidivism, etc. (hereinafter “amended Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities”), and Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended Act (Act No. 15904, Dec. 11, 2018) provides that “The amended provisions of Article 59-3 of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, which provide for the restriction on employment of persons with disabilities for the ten-year period, shall also apply to persons who have committed sex crimes before June 12, 2019.”

Therefore, as the amended Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities applies in this case after the sentence of the lower judgment, the sentence of the Defendant who committed a sex offense subject to adults should be imposed, and whether or not the employment restriction order is imposed on welfare facilities for persons with disabilities and the employment restriction period should be additionally judged. The employment restriction order was an incidental disposition that sentenced simultaneously with the conviction of a sex offense case, and it is no longer possible to reverse all of the lower judgment even if

B. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court’s judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Circumstances alleged by the Defendant on the grounds of unfair sentencing, i.e., the Defendant’s recognition of and against the offense, and the victim’s non-criminality, etc., are already determined by the lower court.