1. It is confirmed that the share of 4/20 of the total area of 684 square meters prior to the wife population B in Gyeonggi-do is owned by the Plaintiff.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. According to the Forest Survey Division, such as the land situation and division, etc. (1) written during the Japanese colonial era, the forest land of Gyeonggi-gun C (hereinafter “instant assessment land”) is indicated as the fact that E, which has an address in “D”, was under the circumstances on December 7, 1918 (7 years in Japan-ho-ho, Japan-ho, Japan-ho).

(2) The land indicated in the purport of the instant claim in the land subject to conversion into the area, land category change, and reorganization of the administrative district (hereinafter “instant land”) has been divided. The register and cadastral record concerning the instant land were entirely destroyed by the 625 column, but cadastral records were restored, but the owner was not yet restored, and the landowner’s column for land cadastre has also been blank.

B. The permanent domicile of the Plaintiff’s prior domicile and the inheritance relation of the Plaintiff (1) the permanent domicile of F, the primary domicile of the Plaintiff’s prior domicile of the Plaintiff’s prior domicile, for the reason for the G of the Gyeonggi-do Yangyang-gun or the reason for the removal from the military injury (eight years

1. 20. It is written that it was removed from Man-gun H.

(2) After the death of the plaintiffs F on March 7, 1948, inheritance and inheritance shares are as shown in the attached Form.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap 1 through 4 (including branch numbers for those with additional numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of action

A. In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to see that E, the name of the Plaintiff’s prior owner and the name of the Plaintiff’s prior owner, and the name of the Plaintiff’s prior owner, are the same to the Plaintiff’s prior owner, and that the permanent domicile at the time of the situation of E’s address and the Plaintiff’s prior owner’s situation are the same to the unit of Ri, and there is no evidence to recognize that the name of the Plaintiff’s prior owner, other than the Plaintiff’s prior owner and the first owner’s name, had resided on the I and J-Myeon as well as the Plaintiff’s prior owner, until the situation of the instant land was determined. In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to see that E, the Plaintiff’s prior owner and the personal name of the Plaintiff’s prior owner, were the same.

(b).