1. The appeal against the counterclaim by the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant).

1. In the first instance court’s trial scope, the Plaintiff filed a counterclaim against the Defendant for the return of unjust enrichment, and the Defendant filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff seeking the implementation of the ownership transfer registration procedure based on the completion of prescriptive acquisition.

In this regard, the first instance court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims and rendered a judgment citing all of the defendant's counterclaims.

Therefore, since only the plaintiff appealed against the part concerning the counterclaim among the judgment of the court of first instance, the part concerning the principal lawsuit was excluded from the scope of the judgment of the court of first instance.

2. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance (excluding the part pertaining to the conclusion “4. conclusion”), except to supplement or add the judgment as follows 3, and thus, it is consistent with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. Supplement and addition of judgments;

A. The gist of the Plaintiff’s assertion is as follows: The Defendant’s possession is the possession of a third party.

The fact that an authorization or permission was granted on the condition of contribution acceptance is merely an obligation to make contribution acceptance.

However, D did not provide documents related to donation and did not provide documents necessary for the registration of transfer even if it prepared a written consent on donation.

Since the ownership of the land No. 1 and No. 2 in this case has been changed without the submission of the actual acceptance of donation and the transfer registration procedure has not been implemented, the defendant's autonomous possession cannot be recognized.

D, G, and the Plaintiff merely allowed the Defendant to use the instant Nos. 1 and 2 pursuant to the waiver of the exclusive right to use and benefit from land, and did not have renounced ownership.

Gangwon-do has only approved urban planning facilities (road) in accordance with the approval of the housing construction project plan and publicly announced the approval of routes under the Road Act with respect to the land 1 and 2 of this case.