The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than eight months.

However, the above punishment for a period of two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

On February 19, 2017, the Prosecutor charged a person who violated the provision on prohibition of drinking driving at least twice the same time with respect to the pertinent drinking driving on February 19, 2017, for violation of Article 148-2(1)1 of the Road Traffic Act.

However, the lower court, however, issued a summary order of KRW 2 million on March 21, 2017, and on February 19, 2017, the same does not apply to the records of “violation at least twice” of the instant provision at the time of driving under the influence of alcohol, as stated in Article 148-2 subparag. 1 of the Road Traffic Act (hereinafter “the instant provision”), where the violation of the provision prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol is limited to the case where the judgment was made conclusive after a substantive deliberation by the court. The Defendant’s power of driving under the influence of alcohol on February 18, 2017, issued a summary order of KRW 2 million on March 21, 2017.

The reason for the violation of the provision of this case is found not guilty, and the violation of Article 148-2 (2) 2 of the same Act is found guilty.

The court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of the provision of this case.

The sentence of the lower court (4 million won in penalty) is too unhued and unreasonable.

In the determination of the misapprehension of the legal doctrine, it is reasonable to interpret that “a person who violates Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act not less than twice” includes a person who is under drinking and has not yet been determined by the court.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below that the provision of this case cannot be applied to drinking driving is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles.

Therefore, the prosecutor's argument of misapprehension is justified.

First, with respect to the literary interpretation of the provision of this case, the term “violation” in the Health Team and “a person who has violated Article 44(1) not less than twice” defined in the ordinary Korean language as “Li Kim without complying with laws, orders, and commitments” in the ordinary context.

The language and text of the instant provision is as follows: (a) a person who has been convicted of violating the prohibition on drinking alcohol driving at least twice.