All appeals by the Defendants and the Prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendants 1 and misunderstanding of the legal principles, ① all possible measures were taken to prevent copyright infringement, and the Defendants had the intent to commit an aiding and abetting a violation of the Copyright Act.

shall not be deemed to exist.

In addition, Article 136 (1) and Article 140 (1) of the Copyright Act should be interpreted as a crime of friendship only when a principal offender of a violation of the Copyright Act has profit-making or habituality. Thus, in the case where the complaint is revoked, unless the principal offender's profit-making or habituality of the violation of copyright has been proved, the prosecution against the Defendants should be dismissed.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles or by misapprehending the legal principles, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2) Each sentence (a fine of KRW 7 million) against the Defendants in the lower court’s unfair sentencing is too unreasonable.

B. The Prosecutor (as to Defendant B), the lower court’s punishment on Defendant B is too unfased and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the Defendants’ assertion of misunderstanding of facts and legal principles, the act of aiding and abetting the infringement of the right of reproduction protected under the Copyright Act is any direct and indirect act that facilitates the infringement of the right of reproduction protected under the Copyright Act to facilitate the infringement of the right of reproduction of the principal offender’s right of reproduction, as well as aiding and abetting the infringement of the right of reproduction of the principal offender’s right of reproduction, including the case where the principal offender anticipated and facilitates the infringement of the right of reproduction transmission prior to commencement of the act of infringing the right of reproduction transmission, and it is sufficient that the principal offender had dolusent intent on the act of infringing the right of reproduction exercised by the principal offender, and there is no need to specifically recognize the date, place, object, etc. of the act of infringing the right of reproduction exercised by the principal offender, and furthermore, it is not necessary for the principal offender to clearly recognize who is the principal offender (Supreme Court Decision 2011Do14322, Sept. 26, 2013).