The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is that each sentence (Defendant A: imprisonment with prison labor for a year and two months, a stay of execution for two years, a community service for 160 hours, a lecture for the prevention of child abuse for 40 hours, Defendant B: imprisonment with prison labor for six months, a stay of execution for two years, and a lecture for the prevention of child abuse for 40 hours) that the court below sentenced the Defendants is too uneasible and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. The Defendants, who are in a position to be specially protected so that children can grow as healthy members of the society as child care teachers, repeatedly committed emotional abuse against victimized children by neglecting their duties and the trust of victimized children’s parents. In light of the circumstances and details of the crime, etc., the crime is very serious. In particular, Defendant A appears to have committed repeated abuse against many children, and even if Defendant A did not reach an agreement with most victimized children or their parents.

B. However, on the basis of the statutory penalty, a discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope by comprehensively taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty. Considering the unique area of sentencing for the first instance that is respected under the principle of court priority and the principle of directness, and the ex post facto core nature of the appellate court, the first instance sentencing determination was exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing in the process of the first instance sentencing examination and the sentencing criteria, etc.

In light of the records newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review, it is reasonable to file a judgment of the first instance court that the sentencing of the first instance is unfair, only in cases where there are circumstances where it is deemed unfair to maintain the judgment of the first instance, and there is no such exceptional circumstance.