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(영문) 대법원 1962. 11. 15. 선고 62다634 판결
[사해행위취소][집10(4)민,229]
Main Issues

(a) Legal act of the debtor prior to the occurrence of credit and obligee's right of revocation;

(b) Payment in kind and obligee's right to cancel;

C. The meaning that a debtor's property juristic act causes damage to the creditor in the revocation of creditor

Summary of Judgment

(a) It cannot be said that there had been any juristic acts detrimental to the creditor, even though it was not confirmed that the total amount of the debtor's obligation exceeds the total amount of active property due to the debtor's property

B. If payment in kind was made in order to extinguish an existing obligation and it was made at a reasonable price, it cannot be the object of obligee's right of revocation.

(c) In registering as the performance of an existing obligation, if the act constituting the cause of such obligation takes place prior to the obligee’s claim, such registration may not be subject to the obligee’s right of revocation unless there are special circumstances.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 406 and 466 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellee

Gwangju College of Education, Annexed Middle School History Association

Defendant-Appellant

Park Jong-soo et al. and four others

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 62Na145 delivered on July 11, 1962

Text

The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

Reasons

The Defendants’ agent’ grounds of appeal are as specified in the attached Form of Reasons for Appeal.

The ground of appeal No. 1 refers to a legal act of an obligor for the purpose of reducing the obligor's property. In a case where a registration is made as a performance of existing obligation, the registration cannot be subject to the obligee's right of revocation unless there are any special circumstances if the act constituting the cause of the obligation occurred prior to the obligee's right of revocation, barring any special circumstances. According to the reasoning of the original judgment, the claim against the non-party Park Jong-young, the obligee, arising between April 1, 1959 and December 14, 1957, and the real estate stated in the List No. 2 (b) of the original judgment attached to the original judgment was sold to Park Jong-young, the obligor, and the real estate mentioned in the List No. 4 sold to the obligee Park Jong-ok, the obligor, to the above obligor, and sold to the Defendant, who is the obligee, the obligee's right of revocation after the execution of the registration of ownership transfer cannot be subject to the obligee's right of revocation, which is an act of cancellation of the above obligee's right.

As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

The reasoning of the judgment is as follows: (a) Real estate recorded in the list No. 2 of the original judgment on December 5, 1959 (1) was transferred to Nonparty 2, who was the father of Defendant Park Jong-ok (400,000) by means of payment in kind; (b) without examining whether the real estate provided as payment in kind was at a reasonable price compared with the original obligation of payment in kind; (c) so long as the real estate provided as it was done by the method of extinguishing it at a price for the original obligation of payment in kind, there is no increase or decrease in the property of the obligor, and thus, it would be impossible to conclude that the act would be subject to the right to cancel the judgment on the total amount of the property of the obligee at the time of the obligee’s disposal in lots, and it would be difficult to conclude that there was an increase or decrease in the obligee’s property at the time of the obligee’s disposal in place of the existing obligation; and (d) it would be attributable to the misapprehension of legal principles on the right to cancel the legal act as seen above.

As explained above, the original judgment shall not be dismissed in its entirety, and it is reasonable to acknowledge that the original judgment should be tried again, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges by applying Article 400 of the Civil Procedure Act prior to the amendment.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Lee Jin-chul (Presiding Judge)

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