All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. “Unfair collaborative act” under Article 19(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Fair Trade Act”) includes not only explicit agreement but also implied agreement as “an agreement on an act that unfairly restricts competition” (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Du1239, Feb. 28, 2003). However, the essence of this is that two or more enterprisers communicate with each other. As such, it cannot be deemed that there exists a appearance consistent with the “unfair collaborative act” listed in each subparagraph of the above provision, and there should be proof of circumstances to acknowledge the reciprocity of communication among enterprisers.

In addition, the burden of proof is against the defendant who orders corrective measures, etc. on the ground of such agreement.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du17421, Nov. 28, 2013). 2. The lower court recognized facts as indicated in its reasoning and determined to the following purport.

On March 200, there is a statement by C, in direct evidence, that is consistent with the fact that the practitioners, such as the Plaintiffs, Skknex Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “GSkknex”), Hyundai Mu Bank Co., Ltd., and Em-Oil Sknex Co., Ltd., agreed to refrain from competition in the attraction of gas stations through the attraction of, and management of, the alternative gas stations (hereinafter “instant agreement”) at the meeting of the “Pkkex”) around March 200 to refrain from the competition in the attraction of gas stations (hereinafter “instant agreement”) on behalf of the voluntary reporters.

B. However, (1) A superior is merely a team leader of the GSknex and thus has no status or authority to make a final decision on the basic business policy of the GSkknex headquarters.