Text
1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.
2. The defendant's notary public against the plaintiff is a law firm No. 1942, 209.
Reasons
1. A creditor of notarial deeds under a cash loan contract: The debtor: The date of borrowing funds from the plaintiff on September 16, 2009: 15 million won: Interest on October 15, 2009: 30% per annum;
A. No. 1942, a notary public drafted on September 16, 2009 the No. 1942 the notarial deeds of money consumption loan contract (hereinafter “notarial deeds of this case”) with the following content.
B. On April 18, 2018, when the Defendant applied for the re-issuance of the execution clause of the instant notarial deed, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit.
[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 3 and 4, the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Judgment on the plaintiff's defense of extinctive prescription
A. Not only a claim arising from an act of a commercial activity for both parties, but also a claim arising from an act of a commercial activity that constitutes only one of the parties, constitutes a commercial claim to which the extinctive prescription period of five years under Article 64 of the Commercial Act applies. Such a commercial activity includes not only the basic commercial activity falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 46 of the Commercial Act but also the auxiliary commercial activity that merchants carry on for business
(See Supreme Court Decision 93Da54842 delivered on April 29, 1994, and Supreme Court Decision 97Da9260 delivered on August 26, 1997, etc.). In order to reverse such presumption, a merchant’s act of carrying on business is presumed to have been carried on for business purposes under Article 47 of the Commercial Act, and is presumed to have been carried on for business purposes under Article 47 of the Commercial Act, and in order to reverse such presumption, a person who asserts other opposing facts
(See Supreme Court Decision 2006Da54378 Decided December 11, 2008, etc.). B.
According to the foregoing case’s health account return, the aforementioned evidence, and the evidence No. 26 evidence, the Plaintiff’s business registration was completed on August 30, 2005 with the trade name of “I resting place,” and the Plaintiff’s operation of the said resting place from around that time. Thus, there is no counter-proof to the Plaintiff’s borrowing of money from the Defendant.