1. The plaintiff's appeal against the defendants and the defendant B's appeal are dismissed, respectively.

2. The plaintiff and the defendant.

1. The court's explanation on this part of the basic facts is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, citing it as it is by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The part of the primary claim against the defendant B (the partial acceptance)

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) The point of extinguishment of the instant fire belongs to the part of Defendant B’s possession, and Defendant B neglected to manage well the production facilities, machinery, and electrical distribution lines so as not to cause fire, and neglected to keep the raw materials with a high inflammable and inflammable high risk of fire at a high time, and did not take measures such as installing fire-fighting equipment to prevent the occurrence or spread of fire.

Therefore, the fire in this case was caused by Defendant B’s breach of the above duty of care or a defect in the installation and preservation of a structure.

Since Defendant B is liable for tort liability under Article 750 of the Civil Act or for the structure liability under the main sentence of Article 758(1) of the Civil Act, Defendant B is obligated to compensate G for the damages caused by the instant fire.

The Plaintiff is an insurer that paid the fire insurance money of KRW 393,788,204 to G, and the insured G acquired the above damage claim against the Defendant B within the limit of the amount paid pursuant to Article 682(1) of the Commercial Act.

Therefore, Defendant B is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the above KRW 393,788,204 and the delayed damages.

2) Defendant B’s assertion that the instant fire did not occur in the occupied part of Defendant B, as well as Defendant B’s duty to take protective and management measures to the extent generally required in light of social norms, such as providing employees with regular training for blocking and keeping a fire extinguisher, while leasing and using the instant building. Thus, there is no defect in the preservation of the instant building in Defendant B.

Therefore, Defendant B was involved in G.