The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for one year.

Sexual assault against the defendant for forty hours.

1. The lower court’s punishment (one year of imprisonment and 40 hours of completion of sexual assault treatment programs) against the Defendant against the summary of the grounds for appeal (unfair sentencing) is too heavy or unreasonable, respectively.

2. We examine ex officio the grounds for both ex officio appeal prior to the judgment.

Article 56(1) of the former Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (amended by Act No. 15352, Jan. 16, 2018; hereinafter “former Act”) places restrictions on employment with regard to juvenile-related institutions, etc. for ten years from the date on which the execution of all or part of a punishment or a treatment and custody for a sex offense against a child or juvenile or a sex offense against an adult (hereinafter “sex offense”) is completed uniformly or suspended or exempted, but Article 56(1) of the former Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “former Act”) limits employment with regard to a person subject to employment restrictions for a period not exceeding 10 years from the date on which the execution of such punishment or treatment is suspended or exempted. However, a person subject to employment restrictions at the same time, contrary to the previous provision of Article 56(1) of the former Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (excluding any person subject to employment restrictions at the same time, who was sentenced by a court under the same provision of Article 56(1) of the same Act.

In determining whether to issue an employment restriction order, it is stipulated that it will not issue an employment restriction order.

Meanwhile, Article 3 of the Addenda to the amended Juvenile Protection Act applies to a person who has committed a sex offense before this Act enters into force and has not received a final judgment.

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Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant indecent act.