1. The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s claim that was changed in exchange in the trial is dismissed.

2. The total cost of the lawsuit.

1. In the first instance court’s trial scope, the Plaintiff filed a claim against the principal lawsuit seeking a return of unjust enrichment, and the Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking a return of unjust enrichment. The Plaintiff’s claim against the principal lawsuit and the Defendant’s counterclaim were all dismissed, and the Plaintiff only filed an appeal against the principal lawsuit among the judgment of the first instance court, the subject of the judgment of the court of the first instance is limited to the part concerning the principal lawsuit.

In addition, in the first instance court, the Plaintiff asserted that “the Plaintiff has a brokerage fee of KRW 40 million against C, and C has a claim for the construction cost of KRW 36.5 million against the Defendant. However, on February 1, 2005, the Plaintiff, the Defendant, and C agreed to pay the Plaintiff a brokerage fee of KRW 36.5 million directly to the Plaintiff, thereby extinguishing the Plaintiff’s claim for the broker fee of the Plaintiff and the construction cost against the Defendant, and thus, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the unpaid amount of KRW 16.5 million out of the agreed amount.” However, at the first instance court, the Defendant changed the cause of the claim to the Plaintiff as described in paragraph 3 below, thereby exchanging the claim of this case in exchange for the claim of this case. Therefore, the claim that was changed in exchange is only subject to adjudication.

2. The reasoning for the court’s explanation in this part is as stated in Section 1. of the judgment of the first instance except for adding “(the buyer, under the instant land sales contract, entered in the name of the defendant’s wife)” to “purchase” in Section 10 of the judgment of the second instance. As such, this part is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. The Plaintiff’s assertion that E, a licensed real estate agent, appears to have used the name “I” from August 12, 2002 to April 2006, and “I” as stated in the preparatory brief dated July 6, 2015 by the Plaintiff refers to C.

In accordance with the request of brokerage, the sale and purchase brokerage of the instant land and the Daejeon Pung-gu F, G, and H, and the new construction and lease of the instant building.