The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s act of buying child or juvenile sex or of arranging sexual traffic as a “business” or “business” and that such act by the Defendant constitutes an act of arranging sexual traffic of this case directly and constitutes a principal offender, and rejected the Defendant’s allegation in the grounds of appeal for misconception of facts and misapprehension of legal principles.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “business” under Article 15(1)2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse and “business” under Article 19(2)1 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from the instant case, and thus are inappropriate to be invoked in the instant case.

In addition, pursuant to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for more than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a minor sentence has been imposed on the defendant, the argument that the amount of punishment is unreasonable

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.