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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2017.05.31 2016나32949
공사대금
Text

1. The plaintiff's incidental appeal and the defendant's appeal are all dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

purport, purport, ..

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the lower court’s acceptance of the first instance judgment is as follows, with the exception that the lower court added the following and rejected the Defendant’s argument “(3)” to “other Defendant’s assertion”, and thus, citing it as is by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, on the ground that it is identical to the ground of the first instance judgment.

2. The addition;

A. The following facts are added to the third and second of the judgment of the first instance.

【Defendant against this may rescind a contract if it is impossible for the contractor to achieve the purpose of the contract due to any defect in the object completed under the main sentence of Article 668 of the Civil Act.

) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the instant construction contract may be rescinded on the grounds of the grounds of the grounds for revocation of the above agreement. Thus, the main sentence of Article 668 of the Civil Act constitutes mandatory provisions, and therefore, it cannot be rescinded on the grounds of the above agreement contrary to the main sentence of Article 668 of the Civil Act. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the Defendant’s argument.

B. The following is added to the fifth instance judgment below.

【Around March 21, 2014, the Plaintiff asserted that “the Plaintiff expressed his intention to waive the price of KRW 4,000,000 for the fireworks-shaped props in D stores to the Defendant on March 21, 2014, but this was a condition to suspend the Defendant’s early payment of the unpaid construction price of KRW 30,00,000,00,00 to the Plaintiff, and the Defendant did not pay the unpaid construction price to the Plaintiff.” Thus, according to the evidence No. 5, the Plaintiff’s expression of intent to waive was already withdrawn.” Thus, according to the evidence No. 5, the Plaintiff sent e-mail to the Defendant on March 21, 2014, stating that “I would remove the D fireworks from its head office,” and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the Plaintiff imposed the condition of suspension on the said declaration of intent as alleged by the Plaintiff.” Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is difficult to accept.

3. In conclusion, the judgment of the court of first instance is examined.

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