The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal shows that since F calls from the Defendant immediately after confirming the original register of vehicle registration, it is reasonable to view that the said calls were not driven a vehicle since it was ordered to suspend operation, and that K, who sent a written message to the Defendant, sent the notice to the effect that K would be at a disadvantage during an order to suspend operation.

In full view of the facts stated, it can be recognized that the Defendant knowingly operated a vehicle in CF car (hereinafter “instant vehicle”) with the knowledge of an order to suspend operation.

2. The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, is difficult to recognize that the Defendant knowingly operated the instant vehicle with knowledge of an order to suspend operation.

In light of this, the lower court acquitted this part of the charges.

In addition to the judgment of the court below, the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, i.e., the defendant purchased the instant vehicle from L with L, and the defendant was delivered the instant vehicle on November 7, 2015 (Evidence No. 18,26, and F’s statutory statement in the court below), prior to the registration of an order to suspend operation in the vehicle registry (Evidence No. 18,26, and F’s statement in the court below), and (ii) the instant vehicle was owned by E (UM, evidence No. 30,73, and 76). The ownership dispute over the instant vehicle under F and G was occurred between F and G, and G reported on March 8, 2016 to F with the illegal name of the vehicle (title No. 89 of the evidence record), and K had no intent to suspend the operation of the instant vehicle to the defendant at the time of its receipt of the order to suspend its use (hereinafter “the message No. 7”).

It shall not be readily concluded.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable.